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This paper presents policy- and outcome-based ways of measuring the progress of 
market-oriented reforms in both traditional areas of first-generation reform and the areas 
of institutional reform that have been emphasized lately.  These policy areas are the 
domestic financial system; international financial markets; international trade; the labor 
market; the tax system; public infrastructure and public firms; the legal and regulatory 
framework; and governance. For each of them, first, we discuss the general principles 
underlying market-oriented reform; second, we present various indicators of the policy 
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ON THE MEASUREMENT OF MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Basic Concepts 
  A market-oriented reform is a policy measure that allows and induces the 
competitive participation of private agents in a sector, activity, or market.
1  Thus, the key 
concepts underlying market-oriented reforms are private participation and competition 
among private agents.  In most cases, a market-oriented reform implies the reduction in 
depth and scope of government participation and interference in an economic activity.  
This is the case of, for example, international trade opening, where the reduction of tariff 
rates and elimination of quotas are indications of market-oriented reform.  In other cases, 
however, government intervention is necessary precisely to encourage competition.  This 
usually occurs when the “industrial organization” of the activity or sector in question is 
such that it lends itself to asymmetries of information, moral hazard, and natural 
monopolies.  An example of market-oriented government participation is financial 
regulation, specifically when it is designed to protect creditor rights and make banking 
operations transparent.  
  A pedagogical, though rather simplistic, characterization of market-oriented 
reform can be made through a “Laffer-curve” approach.
2  For any economic activity, two 
extreme government positions can be identified: Full government involvement and total 
laissez-faire.  In between, there is a large variety of levels and types of state intervention.  
One of them is a market-oriented optimum of government participation.  Below such 
level, there is excessive laissez-faire and the economy would benefit from additional state 
involvement.  Conversely, above the optimum level, there is too much government 
interference and its involvement should be reduced.  Given the historical policy trends 
                                                 
1 The definition of market-oriented reforms we adopt in this paper is rather narrow.  It focuses on the issue 
of economic efficiency and deals with policies and institutions from that perspective.  Our definition 
abstracts from other political or institutional changes needed to initiate reforms or ensure their 
sustainability.  The literature on market-oriented reforms is rich and complex.  For essays on basic concepts 
and meaning of reform, see Williamson (1994, 2000), Sachs (1995), Rodrik (1996), and Kornai (1999, 
2000).  
2 For an application of the “Laffer-curve” approach to optimal taxation in endogenous growth models, see 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1992).   3
that favored state intervention, in most cases government involvement is excessive; 
therefore market-oriented reform implies streamlining it. 
  In the preceding paragraph, we introduced the notion of optimality without 
defining it properly.  Establishing the link between market-oriented reforms and 
optimality is complex and here we limit ourselves to a few basic ideas.  In this paper, the 
criterion to define optimality is given by the most efficient allocation and use of scarce 
resources.  For simplicity, we will call it “economic optimality.” Our first working 
assumption is that the participation of private agents in a competitive environment (which 
is the immediate goal of market-oriented reform) leads to economic optimality.
3   
An important caveat is that a social or political best situation may not coincide 
with an economic optimum.  This would imply that a market-oriented reform that leads to 
an economic optimum might not necessarily produce a socially desirable outcome, such 
as the reduction of wealth inequality.  However, there is a substantial body of evidence 
that links economic efficiency with social welfare.
4  Our second working assumption (or 
hope) is that economic optimality will result in desirable social outcomes by most criteria 
and standards.  At any rate, assessing the social impact of market-oriented reforms is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
A second caveat to our analysis regards the political forces that underlie the 
process of market-oriented reforms.  In this paper we enunciate the meaning and 
measurement of reforms but do not examine the political context that makes them 
possible and guarantees their continuity.  This would require a political economy analysis 
that weighs the importance of vested interest groups, identifies the “winners” and 
“losers” of reform, and examines the political process for structural change (including the 
compensation mechanisms to reduce reform opposition).  Our reading of the evidence is 
that there is no single, well-defined political and institutional framework for carrying out 
market-oriented reforms.  They are possible under dictatorships (e.g., Chile in the 1970s 
and China currently) or democracies (e.g., India and Ireland in the 1990s).  Reforms 
                                                 
3 An excellent collection of articles on the theory behind the link between private competition and 
economic optimality can be found in Arrow and Debreu (2001). 
4 Some examples of a positive link between economic efficiency (and particularly economic growth) and 
social welfare are Inter-American Development Bank (1996); Easterly (1999); Barro (2002); Dollar and 
Kraay (2002); and Demery, Christiaensen, and Paternostro (2002).  However, not all agree, as for example 
Stiglitz (2002); and Stallings and Peres (2000).   4
occur and are sustained whether their “losers” are compensated (e.g., Mexico’s trade 
reforms) or just silenced (e.g., Peru´s labor market reforms).  Finally, reforms are adopted 
gradually and by broad consensus (e.g., Costa Rica) or drastically and by hierarchical 
imposition even in democratically elected regimes (e.g., Argentina and Peru in the 
1990s).  Given this ambiguity, it is quite difficult to rate or measure the political context 
as an element of market-oriented reforms, and we abstain from doing so in this paper.      
The final caveat relates to the interconnection between various areas of market-
oriented reform.  There are synergies between them that must be recognized and 
exploited, and there are optimal sequences in their implementation that must be 
respected.  This aspect of market-oriented reforms, however, falls beyond the scope of 
the paper; thus, we treat each area of reform separately.  We come back to this important 
limitation of the paper in the concluding remarks.      
Objective and Plan of the Paper 
  The objective of this paper is to present ways of measuring the progress of 
market-oriented reforms in various policy areas.
5  These are the domestic financial 
system; international financial markets; international trade; the labor market; the tax 
system; public infrastructure and public firms; the legal and regulatory framework; and 
governance.  Thus, we cover both the traditional areas of first-generation reform (e.g., 
international trade) and the areas of institutional reform that have been emphasized lately 
(e.g., governance). 
  For each of these policy areas, first, we discuss the general principles underlying 
market-oriented reform; second, we present various indicators of the policy stance in the 
area in question; and third, we present various outcome indicators of the policy stance.  
Policy indicators focus on the regulatory and legal actions taken by government, and 
outcome indicators consider the immediate impact of those actions in the economy.  For 
example, in the area of international trade, a policy indicator is the level and dispersion of 
tariff rates, and an outcome indicator is the volume of exports plus imports.  It is 
important to consider both types of indicators: a policy indicator reflects directly 
government’s purported intentions and actions but does not convey whether they have 
                                                 
5 Actual attempts to measure the progress of market-oriented reforms are Lora (1997) and Loayza and 
Palacios (1997).  Both deal with Latin America’s reform experience of the 1990s.   5
any practical effect.  Conversely, an outcome indicator provides information on practical 
effects but has the disadvantage of signaling not only policy changes but also a variety of 
other causes.  The two types of indicators complement each other and jointly offer a 
comprehensive way of assessing the progress of market-oriented reforms. 
  The plan of the paper is the following.  In section II we deal with each of the 8 
policy areas in turn.  It is the longest and most substantial section of the paper.  Section 
III offers some concluding remarks.  Finally, the appendix contains a comprehensive list 
and brief description of data sources on reform indicators for each area outlined in the 
text.   
II. MEASURING MARKET-ORIENTED REFORMS 
A. DOMESTIC FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
1. General Principles.  Market-oriented reforms in the domestic financial system 
consist of the liberalization of credit allocation accompanied by prudential norms and 
monetary stability.  This can lead to the development of sound financial institutions.   
Well-functioning financial systems act positively on economic efficiency through 
different channels. First, they facilitate the exchange of goods and services, acting as 
intermediaries between buyers and sellers.  Second, they facilitate the trading, hedging, 
and pooling of risk.  Third, they mobilize savings, and thus, allocate resources for 
investment.  Finally, financial systems monitor managers and exert corporate control by 
allowing the market to price companies according to their expected performance (see 
Levine 1997).   
The most common pattern of financial reform in developing countries has been, 
first, radical liberalization, and second, implementation of prudential norms that 
moderated the initial liberalization.  In many countries around the world, financial 
repression was the norm in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.  There was the belief that economic 
development could not proceed without financial resources being directed to key 
segments of the economy and that there was no guarantee that the private sector on its 
own would provide those resources.  According to this logic, governments had to 
intervene to direct financial resources to the areas most conducive to economic 
development.  This was done through a variety of instruments, some of them direct --such 
as the creation of development banks for agriculture, fishing, and construction-- and   6
others indirect --such as credit quotas and subsidized rates imposed on private banks.  
Unfortunately, government officials proved to be lousy bankers and credit was grossly 
misallocated.     
The first reforms against financial repression consisted of radical liberalization.  
That also proved to be a mistake that led to many a financial crisis.  Market failures 
brought about by moral hazard and adverse selection are endemic to financial systems.  
The implementation of prudential regulations is necessary to control market failures such 
as excessive risk taking and monopolistic credit allocation (e.g., “related” lending).    In 
this way, these regulations defend creditor rights, promote competition, and prevent 
crises.  It is not easy to determine when a regulation ceases to be prudential and becomes 
excessive, but at least in principle financial regulations have the potential of moderating 
extreme liberalizations to produce a competitive and efficient financial system.   
Financial liberalization and prudential regulation can only be successful in the 
context of monetary stability.  Even the most efficient and well-regulated financial 
system cannot withstand the negative consequences of macroeconomic imbalances.  An 
essential ingredient to ensure macroeconomic stability is a well focused and properly 
working central bank.
6 
2. Policy indicators.  As noted above, there are three fields of policy in market-
oriented reform related to the domestic financial system.  They are liberalization, 
prudential regulation, and monetary stability.   
As its name indicates, financial liberalization attempts to remove the constraints 
imposed on banking and capital markets during the period of financial repression.   
Generally speaking, this means letting the private sector run credit institutions and 
allowing the corresponding markets determine the quantity, variety, and prices of 
financial products.  In such an environment, a series of interrelated financial markets and 
services develop, from traditional banks and insurance companies to stock and bond 
markets.   In practical terms, we can mention the following specific policy indicators of 
financial liberalization: the removal of interest-rate controls, the reduction of taxes on 
                                                 
6 Naturally, macroeconomic balance cannot be achieved by monetary and exchange-rate policy alone.   
Fiscal discipline is a crucial ingredient, and we address it in this paper from the complementary 
perspectives of various market-oriented reforms.  Fiscal balance is induced by an independent central bank,   7
financial transactions, the elimination of mandated credit to "priority" sectors, the 
privatization of state banks, the reduction of reserve requirements held at the Central 
Bank, and the elimination of prohibitions on private institutions to offer a broad array of 
financial services (see Bandiera et al. 2000; Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 2001).  
The policy indicators on the regulatory framework are subtler and require deeper 
examination.  In broad terms, the objective of prudential regulations is to protect creditor 
and shareholder rights against excessive risk taking and uncompetitive practices on the 
part of financial institutions.  In most instances the implementation and monitoring of 
these regulations entails the formation of a supervisory agency.  It is debatable whether 
this agency should be independent of government and/or given broad powers over banks 
and other financial institutions.  However, there is agreement that its main role is to 
promote the transparency of dealings and accounts on the part of financial institutions 
and corporations related to them.  The transparency and accuracy of financial records 
should allow private monitoring on banks and other financial institutions.  However, it 
can be argued that transparency is not enough and that it should be complemented with 
specific rules imposed on financial institutions, such as prohibition of related lending, 
sufficient capitalization of financial assets, and adequate matching of assets and liabilities 
in terms of duration and currency denomination.  In this regard, a suitable policy 
indicator can be developed from the portion of regulations that are adopted from well-
established international criteria, such as the Basle convention and related agreements.  
Lastly, but not less importantly, prudential regulation should establish a clear and 
predetermined procedure for the liquidation of assets of failed companies and banks.  To 
accomplish this, a modern and efficient bankruptcy law is essential.  For principles and 
data on financial regulation, see La Porta et al. (1998), and Caprio, Barth, and Levine 
(2001), World Bank (2003). 
Turning to monetary stability, a right mixture of monetary, exchange-rate, and 
fiscal policies is essential for this purpose.  As mentioned above, fiscal policies are 
addressed indirectly in various areas of reform discussed in the paper.  Here, we 
concentrate on monetary and exchange-rate policies.  For them, the most important policy 
                                                                                                                                                 
by an efficient tax system, by eradication of deficit-producing public firms, and by improvements in 
governance, among other reforms.     8
indicator is the existence of an independent central bank with a clear mandate to promote 
low and stable inflation.  More precisely, although coordination between fiscal and 
monetary authorities can occur at the level of objectives and forecasts, the central bank 
should retain independence in the management of its policy instrument, whether an 
interest rate or a monetary aggregate.  Moreover, experience indicates that central banks 
are able to promote monetary stability when their main target is keeping domestic price 
inflation low, stable, and predictable (see Sterne 2002).  When central banks have broad 
mandates that include from long-run growth to exchange rate stability, they are usually 
ineffective not only in obtaining these ambitious goals but also the basic one of inflation 
stability.  Thus, promoting monetary stability entails the use of a clear monetary policy 
framework and the avoidance of policies that provoke misalignments in the real exchange 
rate and other key relative prices.  One monetary policy framework that has proven quite 
successful in this regard is inflation targeting (see Loayza and Soto, 2002); it is not the 
only one, however, and the appropriate monetary regime for each country remains an 
empirical issue.   
3. Outcome indicators.  Market-oriented reforms in the domestic financial system 
should, in principle, lead to greater depth and activity of financial markets, more private 
sector participation and competition in those markets, lower incidence of financial crises, 
and stronger monetary stability.  The outcome indicators we propose below correspond to 
these broad categories.   
For analytical and completeness purposes it might be useful to distinguish 
between various financial markets, such as bank, stock, bond, and insurance markets.  
However, it is difficult to generalize across countries as to the expected performance of 
various financial markets after liberalization.  Indeed, there is no clear common 
international pattern for their relative development (i.e., with respect to each other), and 
the literature does not find any solid evidence that one of them performs financial 
services better than the rest (see Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2001).  There is, 
nonetheless, some evidence that these markets are complementary.  Thus, we take an 
eclectic perspective and consider jointly the development of banking and stock markets 
(which can be extended to other financial markets, if necessary).     9
On greater depth and activity of financial markets, consider the following 
outcome indicators.  In the case of banking, good measures of depth and activity are 
given by the ratios of a broad monetary aggregate that includes saving and demand 
deposits, such as M2 or quasi-liquid liabilities, to the size of the economy, represented 
possibly by GDP.  In the case of stock markets, the ratio of stock-market capitalization to 
GDP is a good measure of depth, and the ratio of value traded to stock-market 
capitalization, a good measure of activity.   
On larger participation of the private sector and stronger competition, we can 
consider some variants of the indicators on depth and activity.  For instance in the case of 
banking, a good indicator of financial depth that focuses on the private sector is domestic 
credit allocated by private commercial banks to the private sector, divided by GDP.  In 
addition, as indicators of stronger private competition, we can consider reductions in 
concentration ratios within banking and stock markets (for instance the share of the 
largest 4 banks in total banking assets), in the average spread between deposit and 
lending rates (controlling, if possible, for financial transaction taxes), and in the average 
profit margins in banking and stock-market trading.  The database developed by Beck, 
Levine, and Demirguc-Kunt (1999) provides comprehensive, cross-country and time-
series information on depth, competition, and private participation in financial markets. 
When considering the measures of depth and activity of financial markets, it is 
important to focus on their general trend and abstract from temporary movements, such 
as those produced by short-lived credit expansions.  Indeed, it would be informative to 
consider as a sign of improvement not only an increase in the trend but also a reduction 
of the volatility around it.
7     
Although it should be expected that a certain fraction of financial institutions fail 
from time to time (as in any other line of business), systemic financial crises are an 
indication that either the regulatory framework is not appropriate or monetary policy is 
inadequate.  Systemic financial crises can be detected in a number of different ways, such 
as large fluctuations in domestic credit, bank runs in otherwise healthy institutions, and 
massive accumulation of poor-performing loans.  There is a large literature on systemic 
                                                 
7 The long-run trend and cyclical volatility of a given series can be obtained by applying filters such as the 
Hodrick-Prescott, Baxter-King, and other procedures that separate permanent from transitory changes.   10
financial crises, and some of that includes precise measures of the occurrence and 
magnitude of the crises; in particular, see Caprio and Kinglebiel, 2001.  There is also an 
important literature on “early warning” indicators, which focuses on identifying 
macroeconomic and financial variables whose changes precede debt crises, including 
those related to balance of payments, banking, and public debt.  Leading examples of this 
line of research are Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart (1998); and Goldstein, Kaminsky, 
and Reinhart (2000). 
Finally, on stronger monetary stability, the most obvious indicator consists of low 
and stable domestic price inflation.  Nonetheless, a more complete analysis requires 
considering foreign exchange rate and interest rate movements.  Fluctuations in exchange 
and interest rates are to be expected in dynamic and flexible capital markets; therefore, by 
themselves, these fluctuations do not indicate lack of monetary stability.  In order to 
detect monetary instability even before it manifests itself in inflation shocks, it is 
necessary to analyze the degree of misalignment in real exchange and interest rates with 
respect to their equilibrium values.  As the recent Argentinean crisis painfully illustrated, 
low inflation and motionless exchange rate do not mean monetary stability but, far from 
it, may hide large misalignments.  Some seminal work on equilibrium and exchange rates 
are Edwards (1988), Williamson (1993), Elbadawi and Soto (1997), and Hinkle and 
Montiel (1999). 
B. INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 
  1. General Principles.  Market-oriented reforms in international financial markets 
basically consist of removing restrictions on cross-border flows of debt, equity, and 
financial services.  As in the case of domestic financial markets, market-oriented reforms 
dictate that financial liberalization is accompanied by prudential regulations directed at 
minimizing market failures. 
  The globalization of financial markets is possibly the area of reform whose 
benefits and costs are most hotly debated (see World Bank, 2001).  Weary of its potential 
dangers, Keynes advised, “above all, let your finance be national.”  It is argued that the 
main disadvantage of financial globalization for developing countries is that they may 
become vulnerable to external shocks that are difficult to manage and control.  The 
contagion of capital market volatility and crises is a major concern not only for its effects   11
on financial asset prices and flows but also for its negative consequences on real activity 
and employment.  Such is the case, for instance, when the flows of foreign investment 
suddenly stop whenever international markets become disturbed. 
  There are, nonetheless, important advantages associated to financial globalization.  
They can be summarized as the positive effects of a substantial increase in the supply and 
quality of financial products.  These developments are brought about by both the direct 
participation of foreign financial institutions and the upgrading of domestic institutions 
due to stronger competition.  For firms and individuals in need of financial resources, 
financial globalization carries a decrease in their cost of capital, an improvement in 
financial institutions’ capacity to assess and monitor the profitability of their investment, 
and a reduction of their perceived risk (given that portfolio expansion allows the 
diversification of local risk).   For institutions and individuals seeking to allocate their 
savings, financial internationalization opens up the array of available investment 
opportunities, allowing them to minimize their portfolio risk and giving them the best 
possible return.
8 
  Even if the arguments in favor of globalization remain unconvincing to some 
people, the globalization of financial markets is a characteristic no modern society can 
escape.  The radical and continuous improvements in the technology of communications 
and financial transactions are making capital-account restrictions increasingly futile.   
Market-oriented reforms should be directed at accepting this reality and defining the role 
of government regarding prudential regulation. 
  Finally, the relationship between market-oriented reforms in the domestic 
financial system, in international financial markets, and in macroeconomic policy is an 
interesting and complex one.  On the one hand, it is often argued that a precondition for 
financial integration is the development of domestic financial markets.  However, 
domestic financial liberalization and prudential regulation rarely occur without the 
incentives created by the integration with world financial markets.  Therefore, a sensible 
                                                 
8 Naturally, there are limits to the beneficial impact of financial globalization.  To a large extent, however, 
these limits are not due to excessive market participation but, rather, to incomplete markets that impede full 
risk diversification.  A case can be made that in some instances government participation is necessary to 
induce markets to provide key diversification instruments.  For example in order to deal with terms-of-trade 
(TOT) risk, Caballero (2002) argues that governments of small economies should issue TOT contingent   12
recommendation seems to be to advance in both fronts –domestic and international-- in a 
balanced manner.  Macroeconomic stability does appear to be a necessary pre-condition 
for both domestic and international financial reform.  Financial deregulation unleashes 
market forces that take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities created by 
macroeconomic disequilibrium (for example, speculative attacks in the face of 
overvalued exchange rates).  In principle, this can act as a disciplining device on 
macroeconomic policy; however, often times, the correction does not occur orderly and 
can lead to serious crises --such as those in East Asia in 1997 and Argentina in 2002. 
  2. Policy Indicators.  Market-oriented reform in international financial markets 
generates two types of policy indicators.  The first consists of measures of liberalization 
in cross-border financial services, equity flows, and debt transactions.  The second 
consists of measures of prudential regulation and control. 
  International financial liberalization rarely occurs in one step.  Rather, it is a 
process whereby the constraints on various services and transactions are removed 
gradually.  However, for simplicity, we here present the indicators in the form of yes/no 
questions.  A crucial policy indicator that spans financial services, equity flows, and debt 
transactions is whether domestic and foreign residents have free access to foreign 
exchange at all times.  For financial services, specifically, the key indicators are whether 
foreign banks and other financial institutions can own financial assets in the country; 
whether they can operate freely; and whether domestic firms, individuals, and institutions 
(such as pension funds) can use foreign financial institutions wherever they may be 
based.   
For equity flows, the main indicators consist of whether foreign residents can own 
shares in listed or unlisted domestic companies (i.e., foreign portfolio and foreign direct 
investment); whether domestic residents can open and maintain equity positions in 
foreign firms; and whether both foreign and domestic residents have the ability to 
repatriate their earnings and liquidate their equity investments.  Regarding debt 
transactions, they have been traditionally available to governments only; market-oriented 
reform dictates that private agents be able to tap debt markets as well.  Policy indicators 
                                                                                                                                                 
bonds, which private financial companies could then use as benchmark for a fuller array of financial 
instruments.     13
of reform in this area consist of the removal of restrictions to obtain commercial credits 
and consumer loans, to issue corporate bonds, and to provide and receive credit 
guarantees in domestic and international markets, regardless of the country of residence.  
The most comprehensive and authoritative cross-country database on policy indicators of 
international financial reform is the Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and 
Exchange Restrictions, prepared and published by the International Monetary Fund.  Its 
main drawback is that, in most instances, the indicators are binary (i.e., yes/no type) and, 
thus, do not represent accurately the actual extent of liberalization. 
The measures of prudential control and regulation are more difficult to assess.  A 
general indicator is whether the country has adopted international standards for banking 
and capital-market disclosure of information, asset capitalization, and reserve 
requirements.  Beyond that, it is unclear whether additional regulations actually correct 
market failures (as reflected in “herd” behavior, program trading, and purely speculative 
attacks) or, rather, create unnecessary obstacles to financial integration.  An argument 
could be made in favor of capital controls that discourage destabilizing short-term flows, 
such as those implemented in Chile for most of the 1990s (see Gallego, Hernández, and 
Schmidt-Hebbel 2002 for an authoritative evaluation of capital controls in Chile).   
However, it seems that in order to reduce the potential negative effects of external 
financial integration, it is more important to eliminate potential arbitrage opportunities 
derived from macroeconomic disequilibria (particular, real exchange rate misalignment), 
and eradicate implicit insurance and subsidies that induce speculative behavior  (such as 
unsustainably low domestic interest rates).  Creative indicators could be derived from 
policy changes in this regard.             
  3. Outcome indicators.  The main outcome indicators of reform in international 
financial markets can be grouped in the following categories.  The first one corresponds 
to the effect on the domestic financial system.  The second considers the quantities and 
prices of cross-border services and flows.  The third category comprises indicators of 
external vulnerability. 
  Market-oriented reform in international financial markets should have effects on 
the domestic financial system that are akin to those of domestic financial reform.  That is, 
there should be an increase in the volume of private financial assets and a decrease in the   14
cost of capital (including the reduction of profit margins and interest-rate spreads) in the 
domestic financial system.  These indicators are discussed in the section above. 
  The second group of outcome indicators refers directly to international financial 
integration.  Some of the most important indicators are, first, an increase in the 
participation of foreign banks and other financial institutions in the domestic market, 
measured for instance by the ratio of foreign to total number of banks or the market share 
of foreign-owned banks.  Bankscope is the premier data source about banks around the 
world.  The second indicator is an expansion in the stock of domestic assets held by 
foreigners, and likewise, an increase in foreign asset holding by domestic residents, with 
the resulting rise of gross capital flows in the balance of payments.  It is not clear, 
however, what type of asset should increase the most as result of financial globalization, 
whether gross foreign direct investment (FDI), portfolio investment, or debt.  This should 
be determined by their relative scarcities in the portfolio of assets.  In recent reform 
experiences, FDI has been the predominant form of foreign assets.  The most important 
source for data on capital flows is Balance of Payments Statistics published annually by 
the International Monetary Fund.  For foreign asset stock data, see Lane and Milesi-
Ferreti (1999) and Kraay et al. (2000).    
  Finally, measures of external vulnerability can represent outcome indicators of the 
government’s failure to provide for adequate supervision, to ensure macroeconomic 
equilibrium, or to eliminate implicit insurance or guarantees for speculative flows.  Some 
of them are, high black-market premium on foreign exchange, substantial real exchange 
rate misalignment (which, particularly in the case of overvaluation, might indicate the 
need for a drastic adjustment), large domestic-foreign interest rate spreads (which, after 
accounting for risk premia, may indicate the presence of controls), and the classic 
indicators of high levels of external debt (particularly of short duration) relative to GDP, 
exports, or foreign reserves.  For a discussion of leading indicators on external 
vulnerability, see Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000), and IMF (2000). 
C.  INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
  1. General Principles.   There is a large empirical literature suggesting that 
economies that are more open to international trade have higher rates of growth, as a 
result of higher investment and sustained gains in factor productivity (Frenkel and   15
Romer, 1999).  Along with faster growth rates, trade openness brings about industrial 
transformation, changes in the structure of employment, and a decline in poverty (Dollar 
and Kraay, 2001). 
  The literature points out five channels through which trade affects economic 
growth. First, trade leads to higher specialization and, thus, gains in total factor 
productivity (TFP) by allowing countries to exploit their areas of comparative advantage. 
Second, it expands potential markets, which permits domestic firms to take advantage of 
economies of scale. Third, trade diffuses both technological innovations and improved 
managerial practices through stronger interaction with foreign firms and markets. Fourth, 
freer trade lessens anti-competitive practices and rent-seeking activities by domestic 
firms that are mostly unproductive. Finally, trade liberalization reduces the scope for 
corrupt practices by government officers. 
  The empirical evidence indicates that the relationship between economic growth 
and openness is indeed positive and significant, working through both raising domestic 
investment and enhancing efficiency gains (Dollar and Kraay, 2001b). This is the case 
even after controlling for other determinants of growth, determinants that in turn may be 
positively affected by trade openness. The relationship between productivity growth and 
trade-liberalization reforms, on the other hand, is complex and dynamic. Some countries 
benefit more than others from trade liberalization. In some countries the response to 
liberalization comes quickly after the reforms, while in others adjustment is a slow 
process and TFP gains takes time to materialize. This suggests, again, that trade reforms 
must be evaluated in conjunction with other structural reforms. 
  Trade reform aims, first, at introducing greater external competition into the 
previously protected domestic markets and increasing economic efficiency at the level of 
individual firms by using scale economies and comparative advantages.  In this regard, it 
is crucial to eliminate preferential treatment for specific sectors. A secondary goal of 
trade reform is to expand the variety and quality of goods and services available to 
consumers. These objectives are usually accomplished by lowering tariffs and effective 
protection, eliminating non-tariff barriers, reducing administrative requirements for 
imports and exports, and eliminating distortions in exchange rates and the financial 
sector.   16
  This is certainly one of the areas in which reforms are likely to encounter 
significant opposition from vested interests and pressure groups, as well as from 
producers facing adjustment costs arising from the often-substantial changes in relative 
prices. To be effective, trade liberalization should induce significant changes in relative 
prices, which would signal producers to relocate resources towards more productive ends. 
It would also bring about the end of state protection and privileges to sectors or 
individuals. The experience of some developing economies suggests that a pre-
announced liberalization schedule and an unrelenting commitment towards liberalization 
tend to ameliorate lobbying pressures and provide producers the confidence to undertake 
the necessary relocation of resources. 
  2. Policy indicators.  Measuring how reforms affect trade openness is challenging 
mostly because there is a wide array of policy instruments available to affect external 
trade beyond tariffs. Consequently, trade reforms entail eliminating non-tariff barriers 
(such as quotas, exemptions, special permits, and discriminatory practices), reducing the 
dispersion of tariff rates, and reducing the average level of tariffs. 
  The simplest case of reform occurs when protection is based only on taxes (or 
subsidies) levied on imports and exports with no other restrictions. In such case, average 
tariffs weighted by their respective shares in world imports or in production can be 
directly used as a measurement of the change in openness. The higher the average level 
and dispersion of tariffs and para-tariffs (for example, duties and customs fees), the more 
distorted the trade outcome. Reform indicators would then be (1) the change in the tariff 
level, and (2) the change in the dispersion in tariff rates. The interpretation of these 
indicators should be cautious because some countries rely on non-uniform tariffs. In such 
case, even with the same average tariff rate, the effect of protection on trade will differ, 
depending on which goods are taxed at high rates and which at low
9. 
  Measuring trade reform is more complex when countries use additional non-tariff 
barriers. These include foreign exchange rationing, import licensing requirements, 
                                                 
9 An alternative indicator is the average collection rate, calculated as the ratio of import duties collected to 
value of imports. The collection rate seems more appealing at first blush, since legal rates do not mean 
much when there are widespread exemptions or smuggling, as noted by Nash and Andriamananjara (1997). 
But collection rates may also be misleading when exemptions are concentrated in goods that do not 
compete with domestic production, as is common in developing countries, or in imported inputs. In such   17
reference prices, domestic content requirements, and export licensing requirements. In 
such case, tariffs may become redundant, providing little additional protection to 
domestic producers. A measure used to evaluate the level of non-tariff restrictions is the 
weighted share of tariff-code lines covered by non-tariff barriers (licenses, quotas, 
prohibitions) as a percentage of all tariff code lines, using as weights the respective 
shares in world trade, imports or domestic production. This index is probably the most 
useful as an indicator of how much the NTBs protect domestic industry. But even this is 
not very reliable, since the actual effect of the NTBs varies a lot across products and 
across countries, and this kind of index cannot show which are binding (and how much 
these raise domestic prices) and which are not. 
  A complimentary measure of trade limitations is the existence of multiple 
exchange rates and administrative limitations such as mandatory surrender of exports 
proceeds at the central bank, export and import licenses, etc. 
  3. Outcome indicators.  Trade policy reform is effective to the extent that it 
encourages undistorted and larger volumes of trade. The first two outcome indicators 
presented below are related to, respectively, changes and levels of trade intensity. Their 
usefulness as indicators of reform is based on the proposition that trade liberalization 
leads to larger flows of imports and exports, relative to GDP.   
  Using the percentage change in the ratio of real imports plus real exports to real 
GDP as an outcome indicator of trade reform rests on the assumption that average 
changes in this ratio that occur in the medium-term are mostly caused by policy changes. 
Under such assumption, this indicator can be used to compare improvements in trade 
openness over time.  A variation of this measure is the ratio of imports to aggregate 
consumption. The latter is probably a more reliable indicator of restrictive trade policy 
than the former since in most developing countries it is imports of consumption goods 
that are the most stringently restricted. However, using total imports to calculate this ratio 
implicitly assumes at a minimum that the proportion of consumer imports in total imports 
is the same in time. 
                                                                                                                                                 
cases, high rates on competing imports and low rates on inputs can produce a low collection rate but high 
effective protection. Consequently, we suggest using the level and dispersion of tariff rates.   18
  The structure-adjusted trade intensity (SATI) consists of the ratio of real imports 
plus real exports to real GDP, corrected for certain structural characteristics that 
determine a country's trade, such as its size (both area and population) and transport 
costs. This indicator proxies for the level of trade explained by trade policy, and therefore 
allows for comparisons across countries with different structural characteristics. Frenkel 
and Rose (1999) extend this simple statistic to derive a SATI from a gravity model, in 
which trade measures can be systematically weighted against structural factors. One 
obvious problem with this approach is that the results are only reliable to the extent that 
the model used to form the counterfactual incorporates all the relevant determinants of 
trade.  
  A third generic variety of indicators consists of those calculated from a 
comparison of domestic and border prices of similar products. Where these can be 
calculated, they have the advantage of capturing the effects of non-tariff barriers, as well 
as tariffs. They also are easier to interpret economically than some other quantity-based 
measures. The major disadvantage of these measures is that they require data that may 
not be readily available in developing countries. Domestic prices of individual goods 
must be compared to the border prices of those same goods, adjusted for transport costs, 
distribution markups, and (unless the goods are exactly the same) quality differences. 
This kind of exercise is difficult and time-consuming, and has been carried out for few 
developing countries on a regular basis.  As a second-best indicator, it is advisable to use 
the changes in both domestic and border prices, which represents a milder version of the 
arbitrage of price differentials.  
  A fourth indicator usually utilized is the black market premium on foreign 
exchange, which is a proxy for the excess demand for foreign exchange. However, 
demand for imports outside of official channels is only one source of excess demand for 
foreign exchange. The other major source is the capital account (in particular, capital 
flight), which can create a high premium when the capital account is not open, even in an 
economy with a relatively open current account with few barriers. 
  To the extent that trade policy changes incentives in an economy, the composition 
of trade flows in terms of goods and trade partners should also change after reforms. 
More open and less regulated economies should tend to diversify better their export and   19
import portfolios than heavily regulated, closed economies. This may come as the natural 
result of risk hedging by private sectors exporters and importers operating without 
government restrictions on international trade. Indicators of diversification are the change 
in the share of the largest three (or five) trade partners in total exports or in total imports, 
as well as the change in the participation of the three (or five) main exports or imports in 
total trade. 
Finally, in several economies trade liberalization has been accompanied by trade 
agreements. In some occasions, these agreements are the result of the genuine desire to 
create additional trade opportunities and engage in more active competition. As such, 
they can have a positive impact on the economy. Moreover, for economies with relatively 
weak institutional conditions, a free trade agreement can help deter reform reversal. 
However, in most cases trade agreements tend only to divert trade from the international 
community towards the partner in the agreement. For this purpose governments increase 
protection of local firms against third-party producers, thus misallocating resources, 
reducing overall efficiency, and usually leading to stagnation in productivity and 
innovation. 
D. THE LABOR MARKET  
1. General Principles.  Market-oriented reforms in the labor market mainly 
consist of removing distortions, many of them induced by government regulations that 
make labor too costly and risky relative to its abundance in the economy.  These reforms 
may also involve government participation to reduce monopolistic power in manager-
labor relations, such as those potentially exercised by industry-level worker unions or 
large owners’ associations.  Therefore, as in other sectors, market-oriented reforms in the 
labor market usually entail deregulation but in some instances require specific 
government intervention.   
Ideally, undistorted and competitive labor markets enjoy the flexibility that allows 
the economy to adjust efficiently to changes in aggregate demand coming from external 
and internal sources.  In times of negative shocks, a flexible labor market minimizes the 
rise of unemployment, thus promoting a timely output recovery. In times of booming 
economic activity, labor market flexibility guarantees that output expansion is 
accompanied by full employment and rising real wages.   20
Undistorted and competitive labor markets are important not only for the short-
term adjustment to shocks, but also to obtain "broad-based" long-run growth, the kind of 
growth that brings about a rise in income not only to the owners of physical capital, but 
also to the majority of workers.  When firms perceive that labor is too costly or risky, 
they choose investment strategies that are excessively capital intensive.  This produces 
labor-market segmentation (i.e., formal and informal labor) that is particularly acute in 
labor abundant countries and that is not conducive to broad-based growth.   
To summarize then, the main objectives of market-oriented reform in labor 
markets are to make labor markets more flexible, more competitive, and less segmented.   
2. Policy Indicators.  The policy indicators of labor-market reform can be 
grouped in four broad categories: Constraints on hiring and firing of workers; wages, 
compensation, and payroll taxes; mechanisms for negotiation and peaceful resolution of 
labor disputes; and public employment.   
Constraints on hiring and firing have several aspects; we now discuss a few 
indicators on some of the most important of them.  The first policy indicator is whether 
labor legislation considers dismissals caused by economic difficulties of the firm as 
justified; if not, legislation would be ignoring that in an active economy some firms and 
sectors shrink and that this process requires the dismissal of some workers.  The second 
indicator is whether at least a portion of severance payments are periodically deposited in 
accounts in the name of the workers so that these funds and their associated market yields 
are available to workers when they are fired or resign from the firm. The existence of 
these funds signals that labor legislation considers severance payments as deferred 
compensation rather than as penalties designed to prevent firms from shedding labor.  
The third policy indicator considers directly the portion of monetary compensation for 
dismissal that represents an actual cost to the firm; this compensation is usually mandated 
as a multiple of the last monthly wage and varies with the level of workers' seniority.  
High compensation for dismissal is especially distortionary for the labor market and 
costly to the firm if economic difficulties are treated as unjustified causes for dismissal.  
In this case, firms find themselves trapped in a situation where downsizing is the only 
way for them to manage their economic difficulties but is too expensive to undertake.  
The fourth policy indicator is whether legislation imposes restrictions on temporary   21
contracts; this type of contract is needed to fulfill particular needs of the firm and when, 
as result of an active economy, new and rather uncertain ventures frequently appear.  In 
economies in which rigid constraints on the hiring and firing of permanent workers exist, 
temporary contracts may provide a way, albeit imperfect, to make labor markets more 
flexible.  However, to avoid market segmentation within the firm, it is important that 
when temporary contracts become less restricted, permanent contracts be also liberalized. 
The second category of policy indicators on labor-market reform deals with 
wages, compensation, and payroll taxes.  The general principle of reform in this area is to 
allow overall compensation to reflect both workers’ productivity and their relative 
scarcity in the economy.  Some of the most important policy areas to consider are the 
following.  The first indicator is whether mandated minimum wages are binding in the 
sense that they are keeping some workers (mainly the less skilled and the young) out 
from the active labor force.  The second indicator is related to social-security 
contributions and payroll taxes, such as those for disability, death, sickness, maternity, 
work injury, unemployment, and family allowances.  The policy reform in this case 
consists of, first, strengthening and making explicit the link between social-security 
contributions and each worker’s received benefits and overall compensation; and, second, 
lowering the contributions so as not to make labor unduly expensive.  A rather crude 
policy indicator in this area is the rate of total social security contributions (usually as a 
percentage of the wage).  A more complete indicator would consider whether social 
contributions make labor costs excessive (relative to market-clearing levels) and whether 
contributions and benefits are closely connected at the individual level.   
The connection between social security contributions and each worker’s received 
benefits merits further discussion.  If the link is strong, then social security contributions 
are not distortionary but represent a form of remuneration to the worker.  As such, they 
can be taken into account when firms and workers negotiate on the remuneration 
package.  On the other hand, if the link is weak, social security contributions become a 
tax on both firms and workers without corresponding benefits.  A traditional example of a 
weak relationship between contributions and benefits is the retirement pension system of 
the pay-as-you-go type; in this case, what is contributed during working years bears little 
relation with what is received at retirement.   22
The third category of policy indicators on labor market reform concerns the 
mechanisms for negotiation and peaceful resolution of labor disputes.  Market-oriented 
reforms in this area focus on confining government involvement in manager-labor 
relations to the expeditious resolution of labor disputes, for instance through specialized 
judicial courts and arbitrators.  This implies taking government out of the negotiation 
process and placing it in the role of contract enforcement.  Then, some specific policy 
indicators in this regard would consider whether legislation allows for decentralized and 
flexible collective bargaining; whether workers are allowed to choose their own unions 
(which would generate more efficient worker representation through improved 
competition and contestability); whether labor legislation does not induce labor stoppage 
by making one party (usually the firm) bear most of its costs; whether labor legislation 
allows labor strikes only when they are clearly connected to specific contractual claims 
between workers and their corresponding firms; and whether there are courts and 
arbitrators specialized on labor disputes.  
The last category of policy indicators on labor reform is related to the prevalence 
of public employment. In many developing countries, public employment has 
traditionally been used both as a way to solve unemployment problems during economic 
downturns and as a political tool to reward allegiance to the governing party.  Therefore, 
the process of hiring public employees has often neglected to adequately match workers 
to the needs of public administration. This overstaffing and excessively high 
remuneration in the public administration (relative to productivity) has bid up labor costs 
in the private sector and created little incentive for training and human capital 
development in the public sector.  A policy indicator of reform in this area is the 
initiation of a public sector downsizing program, one that provides adequate 
compensation and training to departing staff and prevents the state from losing its 
comparatively most productive personnel.  
On these policy indicators, the main data source consists of various publications 
by the International Labor Organization, such as the Labor Statistics Database and the 
ILO Conventions and Recommendations.  The drawback of ILO sources is that the 
relevant information is dispersed and not always comparable across countries.  These 
problems are remedied to a large extent in the database of labor market indicators   23
collected by Rama and Artecona (2000).  It includes 44 indicators on policies and 
outcomes related to labor markets in 121 countries since the 1950s.  A more recent 
attempt of providing cross-country information on labor market policies is given by 
Djankov et al. (2003).  These data set is quite comprehensive in terms of country and 
thematic coverage; however, it lacks time-series variation as its observations correspond 
to the early 2000s only.        
3. Outcome Indicators.  We consider general and specific outcome indicators of 
labor market reform.  General indicators assess outcomes from the perspective of the 
overall functioning of labor markets, while specific indicators measure closely the 
immediate impact of particular policy changes. 
Among general indicators, we should look for measures of improved adjustment 
flexibility of labor markets to aggregate and industry-specific shocks and for indications 
of reduced labor market segmentation.  Two broad outcome indicators are the rates of 
unemployment and underemployment.  These data are readily available from national or 
labor statistics; they are difficult to compare across countries but, with enough care, are 
useful for overtime comparisons.  More precise measures of flexibility, although more 
difficult to obtain, are given by sectoral-, gender-, and age-specific data on labor force 
participation, worker turnover rates, average time between jobs, and labor force dropout 
rates (for an application to several Latin American countries, see Micco and Pagés 2002).  
Regarding labor market segmentation, a “quantity” approach would measure the share of 
the labor force in the informal sector, defined as the segment of the economy that does 
not comply with labor-market regulations (see Loayza 1996).  A “price” approach would 
compare wages and total compensation between similarly qualified workers across 
different firms (in terms of size and age, for example) in comparable industries and 
sectors.              
Specific indicators measure the immediate outcomes of policy changes.  In fact, 
we can group these outcome indicators using the same taxonomy as the one used for 
policy indicators.  On hiring and firing of workers, the best indicators are turnover rates, 
unemployment duration, and unemployment rates --cited above as general indicators.   
Various worker ratios --such as the ratio of temporary to permanent workers and the 
proportion of workers according to seniority-- are also useful but require an estimation of   24
their “equilibrium” values in order to make relevant value judgments.  On the connection 
between social security contributions and individual benefits, the literature has focused 
on pension reform and used as outcome indicators the extent to which pension regimes 
are based on individual capitalization systems. The highest score is given to pension 
regimes that feature a fully funded capitalization system with individual accounts 
managed by private companies; and the lowest score is given to pension regimes that are 
mostly based on a pay-as-you-go system (see Samwick 2000 for a cross-country 
application).  Ideally, similar indicators could be constructed for other social security 
benefits (such as health insurance, family allowances, etc.) 
Regarding the mechanisms for negotiation and peaceful resolution of labor 
disputes, a key outcome indicator is the incidence of worker strikes.  This can be 
measured, for instance, by the number of hours not worked due to strikes, per year and 
worker in the modern sector.  The extent of unionization has also been used as an 
indicator of the lack of efficiency of manager-worker relations and even the degree of 
government involvement in the negotiation process (which would be the case if 
legislation favors the formation and membership of unions).  However, without context-
specific analysis, it is difficult to ascertain whether unionization responds to excessive 
government regulations, ineffective labor-dispute courts, or the most prevalent forms of 
industrial organization in the country.  
Finally, on the pervasiveness of public employment in the economy, common 
indicators are the ratio of public to total employees in the non-agricultural sector and the 
share of government expenditures devoted to the public sector payroll, among other 
measures.  The first indicator denotes the labor resources in the economy occupied by the 
public sector, while the second measures public employment in relation to the size of 
government (a large share is likely to represent overstaffing in the public sector).  
As noted before, the database compiled by Rama and Artecona (2000) contains 
useful cross-country information on a number of labor outcome indicators, such as 
unemployment rates, wages, conditions of work, trade unions and collective bargaining, 
and public employment.   25
E. THE TAX SYSTEM 
  1. General Principles.  Market-oriented reform in the tax system seeks to 
minimize the distortionary effect of taxation on private activity while generating 
sufficient revenue to finance government operations.  The tax system is distortionary 
when it penalizes specific activities or assets without a clear public-externality 
justification; when it creates uncertainty as to the profitability of various economic 
activities; when it discourages high levels of effort, work, and investment; and when it 
creates incentives to undertake wasteful actions devoted to tax evasion and avoidance.  
By omission, taxation is also distortionary when it does not generate enough public 
revenues and, thus, leads to a growing public debt that crowds out investment and creates 
macroeconomic instability.     
In most unreformed tax systems, tax laws are onerous and tax-collection agencies 
weak.  The formal sector endures the crippling burden of taxation, the informal sector is 
limited by its poor access to legal and financial services, and the whole economy suffers 
from the consequences of insufficient public revenues, that is, public debt, macro 
instability, and deficient public goods and services (see Loayza 1996).  This situation has 
an effect on the structure of taxation: Given that the state’s ability to generate revenues 
from domestic income and indirect taxes is undermined, the state resorts to obtaining 
revenues through both inflationary seignorage and import and export taxes (which can be 
more easily monitored).  It should then be clear why tax reform is an important 
complement to reforms in the areas of international trade (e.g., lower tariff rates) and 
macroeconomic stabilization (e.g., inflation reduction).  
In unreformed systems, taxation is characterized by tax rates that are high in 
average, heterogeneous across sectors, and unpredictable over time (see Shome 1992).    
Therefore, to summarize, the objectives of market-oriented reform in the tax system are 
to reduce and make more stable the tax burden on the formal sector; encourage informal 
firms to become formal; eliminate unjustified discriminatory treatments; and create the 
conditions for international trade liberalization and macro stabilization.  The goal of 
market-oriented tax reform is not necessarily increasing public revenues but making 
taxation more efficient, particularly in the dynamic sense of economic growth promotion.      26
2. Policy Indicators.  In order to implement the principles of market-oriented 
reforms in the tax system, some policy changes must be undertaken.  They broadly fall 
into three components, from which various policy indicators can be derived (see Shome 
1992).  The first component deals with the structure of tax rates.  Market oriented-reform 
usually implies a reduction of marginal rates in all categories of taxes, that is, income 
(both personal and corporate), property, and indirect (sales, excise, and value-added) 
taxes.  Naturally, it is conceivable that marginal rates could be too low and that reforming 
the system would require increasing the rates.  However, this situation would be rare as 
the status of unreformed economies is one of excessive government participation and tax 
burden.  An important related question is how low tax rates should be.  In theory, the 
optimal tax rate is where the marginal productivity of tax-financed public goods just 
compensates for the marginal tax burden on the economy's net rate of return (see Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin 1992).  Therefore, the calculation of optimal tax rates should be 
country-specific and depend on the productivity of public goods and the rates of return of 
alternative private investment opportunities.  It should also consider the likelihood of tax 
evasion and informality, consideration which tends to decrease the optimal tax rate.   
Market-oriented reform also includes a reduction in the dispersion of tax rates and 
the explicit elimination of preferential or discriminatory treatment across sectors or 
goods.  It is always possible to defend, on market-failure grounds, a discriminatory tax 
regime.  However, as a rule, the burden of the proof for market-failure should be on the 
government’s side, which in practice produces the implementation of a very limited 
number of discriminatory or preferential rates. 
The second component of policy changes in tax reform deals with the type of 
taxation, namely, taxable sectors and activities.  Market-oriented reforms in the tax 
system involve de-emphasizing steeply progressive rate structures of income and 
property taxes and reducing the tax burden on export and import sectors.  This is 
compensated by a stronger emphasis on broadly based, low-rate taxes on domestic 
production, such as the value added tax (VAT).  Apart from the economic efficiency 
reasons given above, this shift in the type of taxation is advocated on the grounds of 
collection efficiency, which is a major constraint in most developing countries.       27
Finally, the third component of tax reform consists of strengthening the tax 
administration.  This involves the creation of a tax-collection agency with the clear 
mandate of enforcing tax laws, with enough resources to implement its supervisory role 
(which includes a well-remunerated bureaucracy), with stiff penalties for corruption and 
capture of tax officials, and with sufficient coordination with the judicial system in 
enforcing the law.  
3. Outcome Indicators.   
There is a wealth of outcome indicators on tax reform.  With enough diligence, 
we can obtain precise indicators related to each policy reform.  Here we consider only 
three of them that are readily available and that broadly capture the main purposes of tax 
reform.  The first is the ratio of tax revenues to GDP, which measures the success in 
raising revenues through non-inflationary means.  The second is the ratio of international 
trade taxes to total tax revenues, which represents the reliance on a common type of 
distortionary taxation.  The third is the VAT revenue productivity rate, which measures 
the comprehensiveness of the VAT and the strength of the tax administration. 
The ratio of tax revenue to GDP signals government's reliance on taxes to finance 
its expenditures as opposed to debt accumulation, money creation, or transfers from 
public enterprises.  Paradoxically, while a policy indicator of tax reform is the reduction 
of tax rates, it is generally the case that as result of tax reform the ratio of tax revenues to 
GDP increases.  The change in the structure of taxation, the reduction in rates, and the 
strengthening of the tax administration can lead to sharp reductions in informality and tax 
evasion.  Although the first impact of tax reform on the revenue ratio is positive, we 
cannot say that it is desirable that the ratio keeps increasing.  There is in principle an 
optimal tax ratio to which tax reform should lead.  The ideal indicator is, therefore, the 
difference between actual and optimal tax ratios, as defined above.   
The ratio of international trade taxes to total tax revenue reveals the reliance on a 
common type of distortionary taxation.  As argued above, one characteristic of 
unreformed countries is that they heavily tax the most easily monitored sectors, of which 
international trade is a prime example.  Not surprisingly, the share of export and import 
taxes in total revenues is large in most developing countries; however, as they reform and 
develop, international trade taxes represent a decreasing share of tax revenues.  This   28
development is even more remarkable when we consider that the volume of exports and 
imports increases considerably as result of international trade reforms.  
  Lastly, the productivity rate of the value-added tax measures not only the 
effectiveness of the VAT --the centerpiece of tax reform in many countries-- but also the 
comprehensiveness and enforcement of the whole tax system (see Silvani and Brondolo 
1994 for concepts and data on VAT productivity for several developing and industrial 
countries).  In a context of fragile tax administration, the VAT with its self-monitoring 
feature, has become the best option for revenue generation with limited distortions.  Its 
achievements as a revenue generator have allowed the easing of the tax burden on the 
formal corporate sector and the reduction of trade tax rates.  The VAT productivity rate, 
defined as the ratio of the share of VAT revenues in GDP to the average VAT rate, 
contains information on two aspects of the VAT system.  The first is the coverage of the 
VAT, that is, the extent to which national expenditures are taxable.  The elimination of 
preferential treatments to certain areas (e.g., agricultural products) and the inclusion of all 
types of goods and services at different points in the production ladder imply an increase 
in the VAT base, which ceteris paribus leads to an increase in the ratio of VAT revenues 
to GDP.  The second aspect reflected by the VAT productivity rate is the strength and 
efficacy of the tax administration in preventing tax evasion.  Holding constant the VAT 
base, an improvement in tax enforcement should expand the ratio of VAT revenues to 
GDP, in relation to the VAT rate.  A related indicator that more directly focuses on tax 
enforcement is the rate of VAT compliance (or the inverse of evasion).  This can be 
constructed as a variation of the VAT productivity rate; specifically, the rate of VAT 
compliance is the ratio of the share of VAT revenues in the VAT base relative to the 
VAT rate (where a value of 1 indicates perfect compliance). 
F. PUBLIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND PUBLIC FIRMS 
  1. General Principles. Government participation in productive activities should 
be separated in two categories: provision of infrastructure and production of goods and 
services. While in the former the government provides goods that are complimentary to 
private sector activities, in the latter state-owned enterprises (SOE) replace or compete 
directly with private firms. Economic theory and empirical evidence suggest that, in the 
absence of market failures, there is virtually no justification for the government to engage   29
in the production of goods and services. Even when market distortions are present, 
regulations can provide incentives for private firms to operate in a socially optimal 
manner. Reforms of infrastructure sectors have, thus, three main objectives. First, 
divesting SOEs in areas where private sector activities are efficient. Second, increasing 
efficiency in the production of those goods and services that are delivered by the 
government. Third, reducing -better, eliminate- the budgetary burden faced by 
governments.  
State-owned enterprises 
  In competitive markets, governments have justified the creation of SOEs on the 
basis of lack of private sector interest or on infant-industry considerations. In fact, lack of 
interest was usually the result of government interventions and distortions in other 
markets, such as the financial sector (World Bank, 1995). Infant-industry policies, on the 
other hand, had been generally unsuccessful and quite costly (Noland and Pack, 2002). 
Hence, governments should not get involved in the provision of goods and services that 
can be better provided by the private sector under adequate regulation. Reforms include 
deregulation, privatization, and divestiture as their main tools.  
  In the presence of market failures, governments justified the creation of SOEs on 
the basis that public sector managers can more easily control externalities, exploit scale 
economies, or operate firms at socially optimal levels. This led to the proliferation of 
SOEs as natural monopolies. Evidence concludes, however, that public firms are 
typically inefficient because they operate as monopolies, managers are subject to poor 
incentive mechanisms, and governments often intervene in their operation to fulfill 
political goals (World Bank, 1995). As a result, SOEs absorb large amounts of funds that 
could be best spent on social services and often capture a disproportionate share of credit, 
squeezing out private sector borrowing. Moreover, since monitoring and control is 
typically softer within the government, SOEs tend to create more externalities and social 
costs (e.g., state-owned factories often pollute more than privately owned plants). 
Privatization and divestiture have also been proposed for SOEs in imperfect markets. 
Technological breakthroughs challenged the existence of natural monopolies in 
telecommunications, energy, and transport, thus giving private entrepreneurs the right to 
compete with incumbents. Whenever governments prefer to keep certain firms in state   30
hands, reforms should deal with their inefficiencies, so as to free resources for other, 
socially more relevant, uses. 
Infrastructure 
  A vast empirical literature suggests that differences in infrastructure may be 
responsible for substantial differences in economic growth and welfare (e.g., Calderón et 
al., 2002). Developing countries, on average, show a very poor record in building and 
maintaining infrastructure. Demand for public infrastructure services is greatly distorted 
by cross-subsidies and artificially low prices that bear little relation to costs (World Bank, 
1994). The distortions in prices and output, the heavy influence of government on what 
ought to be exclusively commercial decisions, and the decay of networks, have all 
worked to create an environment ripe for mismanagement and corruption. 
  The successful experience of some countries –such as the UK or Chile– with 
deregulation and franchising of telecommunications, roads, and energy indicates that 
reforms should aim at creating competition where possible.  In those sectors where 
competition is deemed impractical (e.g., natural monopolies with substantial 
informational asymmetries), reforms should set up strong, independent, economic 
regulation. If successful, these reforms will create an environment conducive to private 
sector participation, providing incentives to strive for efficiency savings that can 
ultimately be passed on to consumers and for the expansion in the provision of services.  
Nevertheless, reforms in this area run the risk of failing either by incompetence in design 
or implementation or, most typically, when regulated firms are able to "capture" the 
authorities to set the regulation to their advantage.  The risk of state capture increases 
with the weakness of the institutional framework (see section H) and the lack of political 
will to regulate markets when necessary. 
  2. Policy indicators.  
State-owned enterprises 
  The main reform instrument for SOEs has been privatization, for which indicators 
beyond the obvious are difficult to find. The standard indicator is the total proceeds of 
privatization, usually expressed in absolute terms (millions of US$). Clearly, this 
indicator requires a scale measure to be meaningful. In principle, one would like to scale 
proceeds using public sector wealth, which is unavailable. As a second best we suggest   31
expressing proceeds either as a share of GDP or value added generated by public firms. It 
is customary to use aggregate figures for macroeconomic analysis, but this masks the 
important effects of privatization at the sectoral level. For this reason, the analysis ought 
to be extended to include indicators at the sectoral levels in order to gain precision with 
regard to the impact of privatization in the working of different areas of the economy.  In 
particular, efficiency measures at the firm and industry levels --such as productivity gains 
and service quality-- must be included in the analysis to avoid misleading evaluations. In 
some economies, the authorities may have tried to maximize the proceeds from 
privatization (for fiscal purposes), even at the cost of creating less competitive markets. 
In these cases, the benefits generated by higher levels of efficiency will not be transferred 
to consumers in the form of reduced relative prices. 
  For firms remaining in state hands, reforms focus on two elements. First, enacting 
measures to eliminate transfers from the central government to cover operating deficits, 
hardening budgetary procedures, and increasing accountability. Reforms in several 
countries forbid by law the financing of SOEs deficits. Second, introducing incentives to 
improve on management and efficiency and expand coverage, when necessary. This 
includes restructuring (outsourcing, streamlining procedures, performance incentives for 
managers, eliminating redundant labor, and re-capitalizing firms), increased competition 
(allowing entry of private firms and deregulating prices), and enacting a wide array of 
corporate governance regulations.  Broadman and Recanatini (2000) provide an indicator 
for the latter based on (i) the introduction of a company law that provides for effective 
boards of directors and share ownership disclosure requirements; (ii) the establishment of 
strong penalties for insider trading and pyramid schemes; (iii) the appointment of 
'outsiders' (non-managers) to boards of directors and the introduction of staggered 
elections of directors; (iv) the establishment of an effective legal framework for the 
exercise of creditors' rights; and (v) the introduction of published independent audits of 
financial accounts and credit rating agencies. 
Infrastructure 
  Reforms comprise three categories that apply equally to private and public firms. 
First, applying commercial principles to the management of infrastructure firms or 
facilities. A key component in this case is pricing reform, which we discuss below.   32
Second, introducing competition into a sector or removing barriers to entry so that 
contestability is a real option. Whenever sectors conform natural monopolies, reforms 
should implement regulation of quality, pricing, and access under the tutelage of an 
independent regulatory agency. Third, involving users and stakeholders in the project 
design and operation of infrastructure facilities. 
  The depth of pricing reforms can be assessed using as policy indicator the 
operating losses incurred by firms (as percent of sales or the capital stock), excluding 
transfers from the government. Consistent with the reduction in price distortions, a 
number of countries have eliminated implicit cross-subsidies among different sectors. 
Instead, they rely on setting prices in line with costs and subsidizing those in need with 
strictly targeted policies (e.g., access to potable water and sanitation). The degree of 
cross-subsidization can also be used as an indicator of reforms. 
  Wherever competition is feasible in infrastructure sectors, divestiture (either in 
the form of privatization or franchising) can be measured by the share of public firms in 
value added, providing a simple yet indicative measure of the reforms. For sectors that 
conform natural monopolies, reforms can be assessed be divestiture measures but must 
include also the implementation of regulatory frameworks that effectively separate the 
government from the operation of the business and set explicit, verifiable targets for 
investment, efficiency gains, service coverage, and quality.  
3. Outcome indicators 
State-owned enterprises 
  A widely used indicator of the degree of privatization is the share of public firms 
in value added and employment. Aggregate figures, again, mask the effects of 
privatization at the industry level, which suggests the need to include sectoral indicators, 
in particular in energy or telecommunications. A second indicator is the change in 
transfers from the central government or state banks to firms. Successful reforms should 
induce sharp reductions in financial and operating losses and, thus, in government 
transfers (Megginson and Netter, 2001). An indirect indicator of privatization is the 
change in foreign direct investment (FDI), because in several countries, privatization has 
been coupled with FDI liberalization. We suggest using FDI in privatized firms as a 
measure of reform outcomes, either in absolute value terms or as a percentage of value   33
added. Foreign portfolio investment can also be used (reflecting capitalization), but the 
association is arguably looser. 
  Indicators of improved management for non-divested SOEs focus on profitability 
and efficiency. Measuring profitability is relatively straightforward, as the difference 
between earnings and total operating costs. Interpretation should be cautious because, for 
several reasons (distributive justice, political constraints), SOEs may be required only to 
recover costs and not to generate profits. The customary indicators of efficiency are 
average labor productivity, defined as value added divided by employment. An indirect 
measure of increased efficiency is the observed reduction in relative prices for goods and 
services (e.g., lower tariffs) or quality improvements (e.g., shorter waiting lists). 
Infrastructure 
  Measuring the outcome of the reforms in infrastructure use the same set of 
indicators for public firms. As documented in World Bank (1994), these indicators 
capture the dramatic changes in efficiency and profitability as a result of reforms in 
telecommunications, transport, water provision, and electricity in several developing 
economies. Indicators of the impact of reforms in the availability of infrastructure 
typically consider measures such as kilometers of roads, kilometers of railway lines, 
number of telephones, electricity generating capacity, access to potable water and 
sewerage, irrigation and waste disposal (see Canning, 1998). These indicators can be 
supplemented with some measures of infrastructure quality to provide a richer assessment 
of the reforms (e.g., percentage of roads in poor condition, percentage of local phone 
calls that are unsuccessful, percentage of availability of diesel locomotives, and 
percentage of electricity lost from the system). 
G.  LEGAL AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
  1. General Principles. The legal and regulatory framework comprises the laws, 
regulations, and legal institutions needed to facilitate dynamic economic development 
and environmental protection in a decentralized economy. In the absence of market 
failures, unregulated private initiative leads to the creation and exploitation of profitable 
opportunities through market activities. The legal framework should provide the basic 
institutions for a minimum-cost operation of the market, including the protection of 
property rights, the provision of expedite conflict resolution mechanisms, and the   34
capacities to enforce contracts. Market power, asymmetric information, and externalities, 
nevertheless, do exist and can hamper the performance of the private sector unless an 
efficient and adequate regulatory framework is in place. Regulations should counter 
market imperfections so that private firms lead to investment, innovation, and sustained 
growth. 
  Regulation is a public good that is usually not well provided by the private sector. 
As such, it is the responsibility of the governments to enact regulatory frameworks for the 
different regulated industries and enforce their applications. A general prescription in this 
regard is the separation of regulatory agencies from enforcement units to add 
transparency and credibility to the regulatory process. As discussed in section H, 
nevertheless, setting up these agencies and providing incentives to the staff to operate 
efficiently and honestly usually requires good governance practices that themselves call 
for additional reforms in the State.  
  Traditionally, economic literature identified numerous market failures and 
suggested, as a general prescription, that tight regulation was required to avoid socially 
inefficient outcomes (Stigler, 1971). Often, governments reserved entire areas of the 
economy to be developed exclusively by public firms (e.g., natural monopolies and 
strategic industries). This "public interest" approach to regulation, however, requires key 
elements that are actually absent in most developing economies. First, it assumes that the 
cost of enforcing regulations is small and does not affect the efficiency of the economy. 
Second, it assumes that public firms operate in a socially efficient manner. Third, it 
assumes that managers of regulated firms and regulators cannot use regulation in their 
own benefit.  
  In most countries, however, excessive and often arbitrary regulation suffocated 
private initiatives, leading to low investment and insufficient innovation. Public firms did 
not compete on fair grounds with the private sector since they benefited from ample 
government transfers to cover losses (World Bank, 1995). Consequently, first generation 
reforms aimed at deregulating markets, reducing the cost of doing business for private 
firms, reducing the regulatory uncertainty and arbitrariness, and avoiding discriminatory 
practices among firms or sectors that lead to inefficiency and rent-seeking behavior. In 
countries where reforms were successfully implemented there was a strengthening in the   35
protection of property rights –legally or de facto– with the withdrawal of the public 
sector, and in the capacity to enforce contracts. 
  First generation reforms allowed substantial private sector participation and 
investment. The outcomes in terms of increased efficiency, innovation, and enhanced 
consumer welfare have been somewhat mixed. Second-generation reforms stem from the 
growing awareness that first generation reforms were necessary but not sufficient to 
enhance growth and that many governments failed in providing adequate guidelines to 
guarantee proper functioning of a market economy.  
  Criticisms focus on both the legal and regulatory frameworks. Legal systems are 
deemed too slow and their sentencing too unpredictable to become the powerful signal 
needed by private firms to operate efficiently. Likewise, they do not necessarily provide 
expedite and affordable conflict resolution mechanisms for private sector disputes 
(Basañes and Willig, 2002). One explanation for the observed reluctance to modify legal 
frameworks is that reforms are very expensive, something wealthy nations often do not 
realize because the relative cost of the institutions that secure the rule of law is small 
(Posner, 2002). Another is that a revamped legal system may also enforce bad laws that 
reduce economic efficiency. A third explanation is that there are informal substitutes for 
the legal enforcement and protection of property and contract rights, including arbitration 
(with or without the legal enforcement of the arbitrator's judgment), reputation, and 
strong-arm tactics, such as those used in illegal markets. 
  Regulatory frameworks, on the other hand, have been criticized on the grounds 
that they induce a high cost of doing business and, in particular, that firm entry and exit 
are poorly designed, leading to non-competitive environments. Studies in the "public 
choice" literature provide evidence that regulated firms can affect the regulatory process 
to avoid entry and exact rents, capturing regulators to their advantage (La Porta et al., 
2002). Moreover, politicians can implement entry regulations in order to extract rents 
from firms, and ultimately consumers (de Soto, 1990). Exit costs (e.g., bankruptcy 
procedures) can be equally important in increasing market power and reducing efficiency. 
Since economic activity is a risky project, inevitably some initiatives will not prosper. In 
such cases, society needs to move resources from failed businesses to more profitable 
activities. The legal framework should be designed to make bankruptcy procedures   36
simple and inexpensive, so that resource relocation is accomplished swiftly while, at the 
same time, protecting the rights of creditors and workers. There are, at least, two 
compelling reasons to focus on exit costs as an important component of economic 
reforms. First, failed businesses use resources (such as labor and capital) that earn a low 
return from a social point of view, thus reducing general productivity. Second, bankrupt 
firms that do not exit the market (e.g., when losses are passed on to consumers or 
absorbed by the government) have little incentives to improve productivity. At the same 
time, they block the entry of new and more efficient producers to the market thus 
reducing lower productivity gains in the long run (Bergeoing et al., 2002). 
  The analysis of reforms to legal and regulatory frameworks is only meaningful 
when considered in connection with other reforms. Foreign trade liberalization and 
governance reforms enhance the capacity of the government to provide the adequate 
environment for economic development. Labor regulations have important effects on 
entry and exit and the adoption of technology. Trade liberalization provides discipline to 
imperfect markets even when specific regulations to curtail market power have not been 
implemented. 
  2. Policy Indicators.  Unambiguous, objective measures of the quality of legal 
and regulatory frameworks are very hard to find. Direct reporting by experts and firms on 
the main constraints to enterprise development can be a valuable tool for assessing the 
business climate in an economy, notwithstanding the element of subjectivity and margins 
of errors. 
  Deregulation of potentially competitive markets was the most important of the 
early reforms. Policies included the elimination of production quotas and price controls, 
the liberalization of wages and labor market restrictions, and opening markets to the 
private sector. Standard indicators of deregulation are the number of prices directly 
controlled by the government, the share of production that is to be sold under quota 
restrictions (as % of GDP), and the number of goods that require licensing from the 
government to be marketed. 
  Second-generation reforms focus mainly on market entry and exit, and the 
conditions in which private firms compete. Djankov et al. (2002a) suggest using three 
indicators of entry conditions: the number of  procedures that firms must go through, the   37
official time required to complete the process, and its official cost. Substantial empirical 
evidence suggests that more procedures and longer delays reflect bribe extraction and/or 
capture (make entry less attractive to potential competitors). Predictions regarding the 
cost indicator are ambiguous. A benevolent social planner may finance screening of 
market entrants from direct fees, thus rendering the latter as an imperfect measure of 
costs. On the other hand, higher fees are frequently used to deter entry. Indicators of the 
reforms in exit conditions would include, at least, the legal reform of bankruptcy 
procedures, a measure of efficiency of the bankruptcy agencies and officers, and its 
average cost (e.g., annual number of sentences as shares of filings, time required and 
official costs to sentence). The World Bank is assembling an index of the efficiency of 
the bankruptcy process, based on the procedures for filing, the petition hearing, the 
court's decision, the appointment of an insolvency practitioner, the assessment of claims 
and their ordering by priority, and the sale of assets. 
  Assessing the impact of reforms on the efficiency of the judiciary system for civil 
procedures is quite difficult. Djankov et al. (2002b) develop indicators based on the 
analysis by law firms of two specific legal procedures (the eviction of non-paying tenants 
and the collection of a bounced check). A measure of the reforms would be the change in 
the average time and the monetary cost involved in accomplishing each goal.  In similar 
fashion, three indicators of contract enforcement are the number of independent 
procedural steps counted from the moment the lawsuit is filed in court until the contract 
is fulfilled; the associated time of the procedures; and their cost as a percentage of GNP. 
  3. Outcome indicators. Evaluating the impact of changes in legal and regulatory 
frameworks is difficult because of the microeconomic, specific nature of most reforms 
and also because changes occur slowly due to the presence of substantial adjustment 
costs. Hence, it is necessary to focus on intermediate measures of the impact of reforms. 
If new regulations are better, it should be first noticed in price-quality improvements, 
either as unit-cost reductions (and lower relative prices) for same-quality goods or, 
alternatively, quality improvements with constant unit costs. A second measure often 
used is the reduction in excess capacity of firms operating in a particular market, a result 
of improved management capabilities or better market access. A third suggested measure   38
is the reduction in queuing time for consumers in better-regulated markets (e.g., months 
of wait to obtain a telephone line or water connection). 
  Beyond price-quality improvements, production-related measures provide an 
indirect, yet readily available, assessment of the outcomes of reforms. First, changes in 
average labor productivity at the firm level (defined as value of production per hour 
worked), although interpretation should be careful as productivity also responds to 
changes in relative prices. Second, changes in TFP defined as the Solow residual (value 
added less the cost of capital services and manpower). Third, change in use of factors 
(capital, intermediate resources and manpower), in particular investment.  See Galal et al. 
(1994). 
  To the extent that entry and exit reforms have impact on market structure, 
indicators of the impact of reforms can be derived from changes in the structure of the 
different sectors. Successful entry/exit reforms should lead to declining plant age (new 
firms should displace old, inefficient firms), technological upgrading (measured by 
purchases of licenses and investment in technology), relocation of production within 
industries (from less efficient to higher productivity firms), product and market 
diversification, and declines in unit costs for goods in deregulated markets (Bergeoing et 
al. 2003). 
H.  GOVERNANCE 
  1. General Principles.  A growing body of literature points to the importance of 
governance in originating and implementing welfare-enhancing economic policies 
(Kaufman et al., 1999). The state can potentially provide the private sector with an 
environment in which property rights are respected; legal contracts are enforced; and 
government regulations counter market imperfections. While adequate policies are 
essential, successful reform implementation requires a government with the ability to 
execute them efficiently and credibly. Without governance, it is difficult to set up or 
maintain a policy environment that is conducive to economic growth.  
  
  Good governance is based on five principles that provide the direction of reforms 
and suggest the choice of its indicators. First, good governance depends on credibility: 
governments that build strong ethics reputation are able to reduce pervasive problems   39
such as conflicts of interest, corruption, lobbying, and regulatory capture. Second, good 
governance relies on adopting clear and simple rules and implementing effective 
enforcement mechanisms. Reducing the risk that governments will change the rules of 
the market or will apply regulations to benefit incumbents is critical to investment and, 
hence, to growth and welfare. In countries with weak legal traditions, simple rules place 
fewer demands on courts, are cheaper and more likely to be accurate, and reduce the risk 
of corruption. 
  These high responsibilities for government can be achieved only when the public 
administration behaves both honestly and efficiently (see discussion below). 
Consequently, a third key principle of good governance is transparency. It reduces the 
scope for regulatory failures (such as capture and bias), increases accountability, and 
reduces market uncertainty. Fourth, good governance requires strong mechanisms of 
checks and balances by consumers, competition authorities, courts, and parliaments. 
Transparency and accountability provide incentives to reduce corruption.  Corruption in 
government, especially of officials with decision making power, is detrimental to social 
welfare because it makes the state pursue public policies and programs that benefit 
certain groups rather than society in general and because it encourages wasteful 
rent-seeking activities. Corruption is mostly due to lack of both proper monitoring and 
clear accountability rules; and it is compounded by lack of procedural clarity, complexity 
of bureaucratic requirements, and imposition of overly restrictive regulations. 
  Finally, the quality of the civil service is the fifth crucial principle for governance. 
To a large extent, good governance depends on having an efficient, motivated, and 
effective civil service. The efficiency of public goods provided by the government 
depends largely on the size and quality of the public workforce and on the institutional 
rules which guide its behavior. As discussed by Schiavo-Campo et al. (1997) some 
reforms may not require administrative capacity (e.g., removing price controls), but most 
others do depend critically upon having qualified personnel (e.g., enterprise 
restructuring). Fiscal policy is another reason to focus on the quality of the civil service. 
Expenditure management and tax administration are quite inefficient without a competent 
civil service.   40
  2. Policy Indicators. Governance reforms are very difficult to measure for 
several reasons. First, governance is largely an intangible asset. Second, it consists of a 
potentially large number of components that are difficult to measure individually (e.g., 
transparency, honesty, accountability). Third, these components affect the quality of 
governance in complicated manners, both directly and indirectly, individually and 
collectively. Most reforms discussed in other sections of this paper consider measures 
that improve governance. For example, trade liberalization eliminates incentives to 
corruption derived from cumbersome protection schemes and privatization reduces the 
scope for rent-seeking and lobbying.  Similarly, privatization can greatly reduce the scope 
for rent seeking and lobbying when regulation is correctly designed and effectively 
enforced.  
  One reform that relates directly to the workings of the government is the 
"rightsizing" of public employees. Civil service reform can improve transparency, 
accountability and honesty, enhancing the credibility of policies. It usually includes two 
types of measures. First, eliminating over-staffing, arising from inefficient management, 
political interference (e.g., appointment of personnel to pay political favors), and lobby 
from unions. An obvious, yet gross, indicator of the reforms is the reduction in the share 
of public employment in total employment. The measure can be refined to exclude 
employment in SOE and concentrate in the central or general government. Second, 
implementing and enforcing meritocractic recruitment systems. Qualitative indicators of 
reforms include the enactment of formal mechanisms to allow entry into government 
service conditional upon pre-specified requisites (passage of a civil service exam or 
attainment of formal education degrees), the setup of proper procedures of internal 
promotion (requesting that higher-level agency positions be filled by current agency 
employees, members of the civil service, or sufficiently accredited professionals), and 
implementation and maintenance of competitive salaries, tightly related to effort.   
Elimination of ethnic-based quotas is also an important component of successful reforms, 
although they usually require substantial political negotiations.  
  Considerable effort and expenditure have been utilized to reform bureaucratic 
dysfunctions such as red tape, organizations that only communicate in vertical lines, are 
distant from those they serve, are split into too many hierarchical levels, are   41
unsympathetic to their clientele, and lack flexibility (Turner, 1999). The implementation 
of private sector management techniques appears to be an important tool to align 
incentives within the government. Reforms along these lines include implementing 
performance indicators, benchmarking, and total quality management. 
Decentralization is another reform that could potentially improve credibility and 
governance. Decentralization can lead to greater variety in the provision of public goods, 
tailored to suit local populations (Tiebout, 1956). Besley and Coate (2000) assert that 
another benefit from decentralization is the improved accountability of bureaucrats. A 
measure of the degree of decentralization proposed by Fisman and Gatti (2000) is the 
sub-national share of total government spending. A higher share would suggest a more 
decentralized public sector and, presumably, better governance.  Nevertheless, there is no 
consensus that decentralization is unequivocally good for a country.  There are political 
economy considerations, mostly related to the distribution of fiscal revenues and 
liabilities, that raise doubts on whether decentralization can lead to more efficient, 
market-oriented outcomes for government action. 
  Finally, Beck et al. (2001) provide a measure of reforms in “checks and 
balances”, using as indicator the number of decision makers whose agreement is 
necessary before policies can be changed. Numerous decision makers with different 
policy preferences are likely to respond differently to reform opportunities than single 
decision makers. On the other hand, multiple decision makers may offer greater 
protection from arbitrary government action to individuals and minorities. 
  3. Outcome Indicators.  When analyzing the success of public policies, it is quite 
difficult to isolate the contribution of good governance. There is, however, the possibility 
of assessing changes in the quality of public institutions and services by the way they are 
perceived by businessmen and economic and political consultants, who deal with various 
government branches on a daily basis. These subjective indicators are collected by a 
handful of international agencies, namely Business International (BI), the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and Business Environmental Risk Intelligence (BERI). 
Indicators include, among others, indices for corruption, bureaucracy and red tape, rule of 
law, the likelihood of changes in government, political instability, expropriation risk, and 
repudiation of contracts by government. Indicators are usually used to generate composite   42
indices representing the different impacts of governance: for example, Mauro (1995) use 
these measures to create an index of governance instability while Knack and Keefer 
(1995) select some indicators as being of greatest relevance to the security of private 
property and the enforceability of contracts. 
  Expanding on surveys designed and implemented by Brunetti, Kisunko  and 
Weder (1997), the World Business Environment Survey (WBES) of the World Bank 
surveys firms in more than 75 countries, inquiring about corruption, the quality of 
government-provided services, and the predictability of laws and policies. Kaufmann et 
al. (1999) provide a methodology for constructing indices of perceptions on corruption, 
by aggregating governance indicators from numerous sources including surveys of 
enterprises and households.  
  These subjective governance indicators have attained wide usage in the growth 
and development literature. Its application when discussing the impact of reforms, 
however, should be very careful. First, ratings may be affected by the expert's knowledge 
of recent economic performance. Second, these measures typically represent conditions 
facing foreign or large investors, not necessarily those confronting most domestic 
investors. Subjective risk evaluations remain only partial indicators of the institutional 
environment that can affect economic performance. 
  An alternative to subjective ratings was proposed by Clague et al. (1999). They 
suggest using the proportion of M2 within the banking system, an objective measure not 
subject to contamination by the expectations of surveyed country experts. The 
justification for this measure is that individuals will hold a larger proportion of their 
financial assets in the form of currency in environments where third-party enforcement of 
contracts is unreliable. Money lent to financial institutions (i.e. bank deposits) is less safe 
where contracts cannot be relied upon. The ratio will increase where governments better 
enforce and respect contracts and private property rights. The main limitation of the CIM 
is that, at best, it only measures the tradeoff between holding assets in currency or bank 
deposits. Moreover, other elements affect this decision rendering its comparability across 
countries dubious (e.g., inflation). 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
  In the last two decades most developing economies have engaged in market-
oriented reforms. The defining guidelines underlying these reforms are private 
participation, competition among private agents, and a change in the role of the 
government with respect to economic activity.  In general, reforms imply reducing 
government participation and market interference. In such cases, the instruments of 
reforms are typically price liberalization, market deregulation and privatization. In some 
cases, markets require government intervention precisely to encourage competition. This 
occurs when markets fail due to asymmetries of information, moral hazard, or natural 
monopoly. Market-oriented government participation takes the form of enacting 
regulatory frameworks and providing mechanisms to enforce regulations and contracts.  
This paper presents ways of measuring the progress of market-oriented reforms in various 
policy areas from the perspective of both policy and outcome indicators.  The policy 
areas we cover include not only those of traditional, first generation reform but also the 
areas related to institutional and legal reform. 
  As a final point, we should discuss an important caveat to our analysis, already 
mentioned in the introduction.  Market-oriented economic reform should best be 
understood as a multi-faceted process.  Although for analytical reasons we have treated 
various areas separately, economic reforms in each of them are interconnected.  First, 
they follow the same underlying principle of competitive private participation.  Second, 
the implementation of a reform in one area often requires corresponding changes in 
another.  For instance, a reduction and homogenization of tariff rates requires 
restructuring the domestic tax system.  Third, the success of economic reform in one area 
often depends on complementary reforms in other areas.  For instance, in order for trade 
openness to lead to export growth and a more efficient domestic industry, labor markets 
must be flexible; otherwise, as some people claim, trade openness could just “kill” 
domestic firms.     
Although it is clear that economic reforms require and complement each other, it 
is less clear what the sequencing should be (from a normative perspective) or can be 
(from a positive, practical perspective).  For example, on the one hand it would be ideal 
to have a properly working domestic financial system prior to opening to international   44
capital flows; on the other hand, however, without the incentives created by international 
financial liberalization, domestic financial markets may not be improved.  In the case of 
economic reform, we know that the whole is more than the sum of its parts; however, we 
are less certain as to whether the process should be balanced across reforms or whether 
some of them must take the lead.  Measurement issues dealing with the complementarity 
and sequencing of market-oriented reforms remain an important but relatively unexplored 
area of research.   45
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“
S
t
a
t
u
s
 
Q
u
o
 
B
i
a
s
 
i
n
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
R
e
f
o
r
m
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
”
 
A
b
i
a
d
 
a
n
d
 
A
.
 
M
o
d
y
 
T
h
i
s
 
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
 
o
f
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
l
i
b
e
r
a
l
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
:
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
,
 
E
n
t
r
y
 
b
a
r
r
i
e
r
s
,
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
3
5
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
 
1
9
7
3
-
9
6
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
D
a
t
a
 
B
a
s
e
,
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
&
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
o
r
s
 
T
h
e
 
E
M
D
B
 
h
a
s
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
f
a
m
i
l
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
:
 
t
h
e
 
I
F
C
I
 
(
I
n
v
e
s
t
a
b
l
e
)
 
i
n
d
e
x
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
o
n
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
r
e
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
;
 
t
h
e
 
I
F
C
G
 
(
G
l
o
b
a
l
)
 
i
n
d
e
x
e
s
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
r
a
c
k
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
s
t
 
a
c
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
r
e
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
e
v
e
n
 
i
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
 
a
r
e
 
u
n
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
 
(
t
h
e
 
b
r
o
a
d
e
s
t
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
 
o
f
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
m
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
s
)
;
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
I
F
C
F
 
(
F
r
o
n
t
i
e
r
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
)
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
2
0
 
s
m
a
l
l
e
r
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
E
M
D
B
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
d
a
i
l
y
 
c
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
3
4
 
s
t
o
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
e
k
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
n
t
h
l
y
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
o
f
 
a
n
o
t
h
e
r
 
2
0
 
l
e
s
s
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
 
“
f
r
o
n
t
i
e
r
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
.
”
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
 
F
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
I
F
C
,
 
g
o
 
t
o
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
f
c
.
o
r
g
/
e
m
d
b
 
 
 
 
O
r
 
v
i
s
i
t
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
a
n
d
p
o
o
r
s
.
c
o
m
 
f
o
r
 
m
o
r
e
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
&
 
P
o
o
r
’
s
.
  
5
1
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
 
 
 
“
T
h
e
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
S
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
B
a
n
k
s
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
:
 
A
 
N
e
w
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
”
 
G
.
 
C
a
p
r
i
o
,
 
J
.
 
B
a
r
t
h
 
 
a
n
d
 
R
.
 
L
e
v
i
n
e
 
 
B
a
r
t
h
,
 
C
a
p
r
i
o
,
 
a
n
d
 
L
e
v
i
n
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
c
u
s
s
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
p
r
e
h
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
i
n
 
1
0
7
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
,
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
s
 
s
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
i
t
i
e
s
,
 
a
r
e
 
n
o
w
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
m
a
k
e
r
s
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
l
d
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
w
a
s
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
i
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
8
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
s
p
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
s
 
e
n
t
r
y
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
a
u
d
i
t
i
n
g
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
d
e
p
o
s
i
t
 
i
n
s
u
r
a
n
c
e
 
s
c
h
e
m
e
s
,
 
l
o
a
n
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
v
i
s
i
o
n
i
n
g
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
t
r
o
u
b
l
e
d
 
b
a
n
k
 
r
e
s
o
l
u
t
i
o
n
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
(
u
n
i
q
u
e
l
y
)
 
t
h
e
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
s
u
p
e
r
v
i
s
o
r
y
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
w
w
w
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
/
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
/
b
a
n
k
_
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
.
h
t
m
 
o
r
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
v
i
e
w
.
p
h
p
?
t
y
p
e
=
5
&
i
d
=
1
6
9
7
 
 
 
 
 
“
B
a
n
k
 
I
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
i
e
s
:
 
C
r
o
s
s
-
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
E
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
 
(
1
9
9
6
)
”
 
 
G
.
 
C
a
p
r
i
o
 
a
n
d
 
D
.
 
K
l
i
n
g
e
b
i
e
l
 
 
T
h
e
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
 
d
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
b
a
n
k
 
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
 
e
p
i
s
o
d
e
s
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
 
1
9
7
0
s
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
n
e
w
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
i
n
 
c
o
n
j
u
n
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
r
e
a
d
i
l
y
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
d
a
t
a
.
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
s
e
v
e
n
 
t
a
b
l
e
s
 
o
n
:
 
a
)
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
b
a
n
k
 
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
e
p
i
s
o
d
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
i
c
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
c
r
i
s
e
s
;
 
b
)
 
m
a
i
n
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
c
r
i
s
e
s
;
 
c
)
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
c
r
i
s
i
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
;
 
d
)
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
i
o
r
 
t
o
 
c
r
i
s
e
s
;
 
e
)
 
r
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
;
 
f
)
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
i
s
i
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
;
 
a
n
d
 
g
)
 
r
e
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
i
n
g
 
o
u
t
c
o
m
e
 
i
n
 
c
r
i
s
i
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
v
i
e
w
.
p
h
p
?
t
y
p
e
=
5
&
i
d
=
1
3
3
8
1
 
 
 
 
 
“
L
a
w
 
a
n
d
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
(
1
9
9
8
)
”
 
R
.
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
,
 
F
.
 
L
ó
p
e
z
 
d
e
 
S
i
l
a
n
e
s
,
 
A
.
 
S
h
l
e
i
f
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
R
.
 
W
.
 
V
i
s
h
n
y
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
p
a
p
e
r
 
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
 
l
e
g
a
l
 
r
u
l
e
s
 
c
o
v
e
r
i
n
g
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
o
r
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
r
u
l
e
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
e
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
4
9
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
p
o
s
t
.
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
.
h
a
r
v
a
r
d
.
e
d
u
/
f
a
c
u
l
t
y
/
l
a
p
o
r
t
a
/
l
a
p
o
r
t
a
.
h
t
m
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
E
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
B
o
n
d
 
I
n
d
e
x
,
 
J
 
P
 
M
o
r
g
a
n
 
T
h
e
 
E
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
B
o
n
d
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
P
l
u
s
 
(
E
M
B
I
+
)
 
t
r
a
c
k
s
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
r
e
t
u
r
n
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
d
e
b
t
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
-
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
-
d
e
n
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
B
r
a
d
y
 
b
o
n
d
s
,
 
l
o
a
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
E
u
r
o
b
o
n
d
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
U
.
S
.
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
E
M
B
I
+
 
e
x
p
a
n
d
s
 
u
p
o
n
 
M
o
r
g
a
n
'
s
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
a
l
 
E
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
B
o
n
d
 
I
n
d
e
x
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
a
s
 
i
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
 
i
n
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
2
.
j
p
m
o
r
g
a
n
.
c
o
m
/
M
a
r
k
e
t
D
a
t
a
I
n
d
/
E
M
B
I
/
e
m
b
i
.
h
t
m
l
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
d
a
t
a
s
t
r
e
a
m
.
c
o
m
  
5
2
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
1
9
9
2
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
v
e
r
s
 
o
n
l
y
 
B
r
a
d
y
 
b
o
n
d
s
.
 
I
n
 
a
d
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
t
o
 
s
e
r
v
i
n
g
 
a
s
 
a
 
b
e
n
c
h
m
a
r
k
,
 
t
h
e
 
E
M
B
I
+
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
o
r
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
d
e
f
i
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
f
o
r
 
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
-
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
d
e
b
t
,
 
a
 
l
i
s
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
d
,
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
i
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
t
e
r
m
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
E
M
B
I
+
 
i
s
 
c
o
n
c
e
n
t
r
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
,
 
B
r
a
z
i
l
,
 
a
n
d
 
M
e
x
i
c
o
)
,
 
r
e
f
l
e
c
t
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
z
e
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
d
e
b
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
n
o
n
-
L
a
t
i
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
b
y
 
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
,
 
M
o
r
o
c
c
o
,
 
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
,
 
t
h
e
 
P
h
i
l
i
p
p
i
n
e
s
,
 
P
o
l
a
n
d
,
 
R
u
s
s
i
a
,
 
a
n
d
 
S
o
u
t
h
 
A
f
r
i
c
a
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
c
o
m
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
a
 
s
e
t
 
o
f
 
b
r
o
k
e
r
-
t
r
a
d
e
d
 
d
e
b
t
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
d
e
l
y
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
q
u
o
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
m
a
k
e
r
s
.
 
I
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
E
M
B
I
+
 
m
u
s
t
 
h
a
v
e
 
a
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
o
f
 
$
5
0
0
 
m
i
l
l
i
o
n
 
o
u
t
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
.
 
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
b
l
o
o
m
b
e
r
g
.
c
o
m
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
,
 
H
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
 
F
o
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
n
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
o
p
e
n
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
.
 
D
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
9
5
 
f
o
r
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
1
6
1
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
h
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
.
o
r
g
 
 
 
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
,
 
F
r
a
s
e
r
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
C
r
e
d
i
t
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
,
 
a
v
o
i
d
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
l
e
a
d
 
t
o
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
r
e
s
t
 
r
a
t
e
s
.
 
D
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
o
n
 
5
-
y
e
a
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
a
l
s
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
7
0
 
f
o
r
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
1
2
3
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
f
r
a
s
e
r
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
.
c
a
 
 
 
 
  
5
3
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
B
A
N
K
S
C
O
P
E
 
B
a
n
k
s
c
o
p
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
o
n
 
1
1
,
0
0
0
 
w
o
r
l
d
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
o
f
f
e
r
i
n
g
 
s
u
b
s
c
r
i
b
e
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
d
a
t
a
:
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
8
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
p
 
6
,
5
0
0
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
t
o
p
 
1
,
4
0
0
 
N
o
r
t
h
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
a
l
l
 
t
h
e
 
2
0
0
 
J
a
p
a
n
e
s
e
 
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
i
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
g
o
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
m
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
2
,
9
0
0
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
b
a
n
k
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
a
d
i
n
g
 
3
8
 
s
u
p
r
a
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
s
 
o
n
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
(
s
h
a
r
e
h
o
l
d
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
b
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
s
u
b
s
i
d
i
a
r
i
e
s
)
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
4
,
0
0
0
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
w
o
r
l
d
w
i
d
e
,
 
2
 
y
e
a
r
s
 
o
f
 
R
e
u
t
e
r
s
 
f
u
l
l
 
t
e
x
t
 
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
b
a
n
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
o
n
l
i
n
e
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
s
t
 
r
e
c
e
n
t
 
n
e
w
s
,
 
F
i
t
c
h
,
 
M
o
o
d
y
'
s
,
 
S
&
P
 
R
a
t
i
n
g
s
,
 
C
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
I
n
t
e
l
l
i
g
e
n
c
e
 
R
a
t
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
,
 
E
.
I
.
U
.
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
R
i
s
k
 
R
a
t
i
n
g
s
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
,
 
E
.
I
.
U
.
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
b
a
n
k
s
c
o
p
e
.
b
v
d
e
p
.
c
o
m
 
 
 
 
 
I
N
T
E
R
N
A
T
I
O
N
A
L
 
F
I
N
A
N
C
I
A
L
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
B
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
P
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
F
u
n
d
 
T
h
e
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
I
M
F
 
d
i
s
s
e
m
i
n
a
t
e
s
 
a
 
w
i
d
e
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
a
r
e
a
 
o
f
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
(
I
I
P
)
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
:
 
 
D
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
r
e
s
e
r
v
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
y
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
,
 
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
d
e
b
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
f
l
o
w
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
m
f
.
o
r
g
/
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
/
n
p
/
s
t
a
/
b
o
p
/
b
o
p
.
h
t
m
 
o
r
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
m
f
.
o
r
g
/
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
/
p
u
b
s
/
p
u
b
s
/
s
t
a
t
p
a
c
k
.
h
t
m
 
 
 
 
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
A
r
r
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
E
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
F
u
n
d
 
T
h
e
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
a
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
r
r
a
n
g
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
n
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
s
,
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
 
t
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
m
f
.
o
r
g
/
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
/
p
u
b
s
/
c
a
t
/
l
o
n
g
r
e
s
.
c
f
m
?
s
k
=
3
6
7
8
.
0
 
 
 
 
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
C
a
r
i
b
b
e
a
n
,
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
C
a
r
i
b
b
e
a
n
,
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
T
h
e
s
e
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
D
i
r
e
c
t
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
f
l
o
w
s
 
t
o
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
C
a
r
i
b
b
e
a
n
 
i
n
 
r
e
c
e
n
t
 
y
e
a
r
s
.
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
e
c
l
a
c
.
c
l
 
  
5
4
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
D
i
r
e
c
t
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
 
O
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
C
o
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
 
 
T
h
i
s
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
g
a
t
h
e
r
s
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
a
n
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
O
E
C
D
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
D
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
b
r
o
k
e
n
 
d
o
w
n
 
b
y
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
,
 
g
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
i
c
a
l
 
z
o
n
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
f
o
r
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
f
l
o
w
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
o
c
k
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
s
o
u
r
c
e
o
e
c
d
.
c
o
m
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
,
 
H
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
 
F
o
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
f
l
o
w
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
s
c
r
u
t
i
n
i
z
i
n
g
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
t
o
w
a
r
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
 
o
r
d
e
r
 
t
o
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
 
i
t
s
 
o
v
e
r
a
l
l
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
c
l
i
m
a
t
e
.
 
D
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
9
5
 
f
o
r
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
1
6
1
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
h
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
.
o
r
g
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
,
 
F
r
a
s
e
r
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
)
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
t
o
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
r
s
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
:
 
•
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
o
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
c
i
t
i
z
e
n
s
 
t
o
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
(
G
C
R
)
 
o
 
R
e
s
t
r
i
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
o
f
 
c
i
t
i
z
e
n
s
 
t
o
 
e
n
g
a
g
e
 
i
n
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
r
s
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
c
a
p
i
t
a
l
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
1
3
 
I
M
F
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
f
r
a
s
e
r
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
.
c
a
 
 
 
 
 
I
N
T
E
R
N
A
T
I
O
N
A
L
 
T
R
A
D
E
 
 
 
 
 
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
C
o
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
H
a
n
d
b
o
o
k
 
o
f
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
e
 
U
N
C
T
A
D
 
H
a
n
d
b
o
o
k
 
o
f
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
O
n
-
l
i
n
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
r
e
h
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
d
a
t
a
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
l
d
 
t
r
a
d
e
,
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
o
v
e
r
 
1
9
0
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
5
0
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
o
r
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
c
o
v
e
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
:
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
m
e
r
c
h
a
n
d
i
s
e
 
t
r
a
d
e
;
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
i
n
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
;
 
E
x
p
o
r
t
 
a
n
d
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
b
y
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
a
n
d
 
b
y
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
 
a
n
d
 
d
e
s
t
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
;
 
V
o
l
u
m
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
;
 
C
o
m
m
o
d
i
t
y
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
l
e
v
a
n
t
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
;
 
F
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
;
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
,
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
s
;
 
S
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
o
f
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
:
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
u
n
c
t
a
d
.
o
r
g
/
T
e
m
p
l
a
t
e
s
/
P
a
g
e
.
a
s
p
?
i
n
t
I
t
e
m
I
D
=
1
8
9
0
&
l
a
n
g
=
1
 
  
5
5
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
 
 
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
C
a
r
i
b
b
e
a
n
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
-
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
B
a
n
k
 
D
A
T
A
I
N
T
A
L
 
i
s
 
a
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
o
f
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
s
.
 
I
t
 
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
s
 
a
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
u
s
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
q
u
i
c
k
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
e
a
s
i
l
y
 
q
u
e
r
y
 
t
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
n
d
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
i
n
 
a
 
t
a
b
l
e
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
p
r
i
n
t
e
d
 
o
r
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
i
n
t
o
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
.
 
I
t
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
C
a
r
i
b
b
e
a
n
 
(
I
N
T
A
L
)
 
i
n
 
B
u
e
n
o
s
 
A
i
r
e
s
,
 
A
r
g
e
n
t
i
n
a
,
 
a
 
u
n
i
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
s
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
-
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
B
a
n
k
 
(
I
A
D
B
)
 
t
o
g
e
t
h
e
r
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
U
n
i
t
 
o
f
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
a
n
d
 
Q
u
a
n
t
i
t
a
t
i
v
e
 
A
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
.
 
I
N
T
A
L
 
h
a
s
 
b
e
e
n
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
8
4
 
m
a
i
n
l
y
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
l
 
u
s
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
I
A
D
B
.
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
a
d
b
.
o
r
g
/
i
n
t
a
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D
i
r
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
F
u
n
d
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
b
i
l
a
t
e
r
a
l
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
2
8
3
 
t
r
a
d
i
n
g
 
p
a
r
t
n
e
r
s
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
5
0
.
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
m
f
.
o
r
g
/
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
/
p
u
b
s
/
p
u
b
s
/
s
t
a
t
p
a
c
k
.
h
t
m
 
 
 
 
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
,
 
H
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
 
F
o
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
a
n
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
(
“
T
r
a
d
e
”
)
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
t
o
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
h
i
n
d
e
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
e
e
 
f
l
o
w
 
o
f
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
c
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
.
 
 
D
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
l
y
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
9
5
 
f
o
r
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
1
6
1
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
h
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
.
o
r
g
 
 
 
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
,
 
F
r
a
s
e
r
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
 
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
(
a
n
d
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
)
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
 
t
h
e
 
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
t
o
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
e
r
s
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
:
 
•
 
T
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
a
d
e
:
 
o
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
o
n
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
s
 
p
l
u
s
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
s
 
o
 
M
e
a
n
 
t
a
r
i
f
f
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
d
e
v
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
a
r
i
f
f
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
•
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
b
a
r
r
i
e
r
s
:
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
f
r
a
s
e
r
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
.
c
a
 
 
  
5
6
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
o
 
H
i
d
d
e
n
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
b
a
r
r
i
e
r
s
 
o
 
C
o
s
t
s
 
o
f
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
:
 
T
h
e
 
c
o
m
b
i
n
e
d
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
o
f
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
t
a
r
i
f
f
s
,
 
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
 
f
e
e
s
,
 
b
a
n
k
 
f
e
e
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
t
i
m
e
 
r
e
q
u
i
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
d
-
t
a
p
e
 
 
•
 
A
c
t
u
a
l
 
s
i
z
e
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
 
s
i
z
e
 
•
 
D
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
r
a
t
e
 
a
n
d
 
b
l
a
c
k
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
r
a
t
e
 
 
 
 
 
L
A
B
O
R
 
M
A
R
K
E
T
 
 
 
 
 
 
“
A
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
o
f
 
L
a
b
o
r
-
M
a
r
k
e
t
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
A
c
r
o
s
s
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
(
2
0
0
0
)
”
 
M
.
 
R
a
m
a
 
a
n
d
 
R
.
 
A
r
t
e
c
o
n
a
 
T
h
i
s
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
4
4
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
,
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
k
 
a
n
d
 
b
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
,
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
u
n
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
,
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
s
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
s
.
 
I
t
 
c
o
v
e
r
s
 
1
2
1
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
1
1
 
f
i
v
e
-
y
e
a
r
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
s
,
 
s
t
a
r
t
i
n
g
 
i
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
W
a
r
 
I
I
.
 
 
 
 
R
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
:
 
m
r
a
m
a
@
w
o
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
O
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
T
h
e
 
I
L
O
'
s
 
m
a
i
n
 
"
f
l
a
g
s
h
i
p
"
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
s
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
:
 
•
 
L
A
B
O
R
S
T
A
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
I
L
O
 
B
u
r
e
a
u
 
o
f
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
u
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
w
a
g
e
s
,
 
h
o
u
r
s
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
k
,
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
c
o
s
t
,
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
e
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
e
s
,
 
o
c
c
u
p
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
i
n
j
u
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
s
t
r
i
k
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
l
o
c
k
o
u
t
s
.
 
•
 
N
A
T
L
E
X
 
i
s
 
a
 
c
o
n
t
i
n
u
o
u
s
l
y
 
u
p
d
a
t
e
d
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
t
o
 
o
v
e
r
 
5
5
,
0
0
0
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
a
w
s
 
o
n
 
l
a
b
o
r
,
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
h
u
m
a
n
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
3
0
0
 
l
a
w
s
 
i
n
 
f
u
l
l
 
t
e
x
t
.
 
 
•
 
I
L
O
L
E
X
 
i
s
 
a
 
t
r
i
l
i
n
g
u
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
I
L
O
 
C
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
c
o
m
m
e
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
r
a
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
c
o
m
m
e
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e
 
o
f
 
E
x
p
e
r
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
C
o
m
m
i
t
t
e
e
 
o
n
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
o
f
 
A
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
r
e
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
c
o
m
p
l
a
i
n
t
s
,
 
i
n
t
e
r
p
r
e
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
n
u
m
e
r
o
u
s
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
•
 
L
A
B
O
R
D
O
C
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
r
e
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
t
o
 
a
 
w
i
d
e
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
e
l
e
c
t
r
o
n
i
c
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
j
o
u
r
n
a
l
 
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
s
,
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
r
o
u
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
l
d
,
 
o
n
 
a
l
l
 
a
s
p
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
k
 
a
n
d
 
s
u
s
t
a
i
n
a
b
l
e
 
l
i
v
e
l
i
h
o
o
d
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
k
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
p
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
h
u
m
a
n
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
.
 
L
A
B
O
R
D
O
C
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
a
n
 
e
v
e
r
-
i
n
c
r
e
a
s
i
n
g
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
l
i
n
k
s
 
t
o
 
o
n
l
i
n
e
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
w
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
l
o
.
o
r
g
 
 
A
c
c
e
s
s
 
t
o
 
I
L
O
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
s
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
l
o
.
o
r
g
/
p
u
b
l
i
c
/
e
n
g
l
i
s
h
/
s
u
p
p
o
r
t
/
l
i
b
/
d
b
l
i
s
t
.
h
t
m
 
 
 
S
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
w
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
l
a
b
o
r
s
t
a
.
i
l
o
.
o
r
g
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
n
a
t
l
e
x
.
i
l
o
.
o
r
g
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
i
l
o
l
e
x
.
i
l
o
.
c
h
:
1
5
6
7
/
e
n
g
l
i
s
h
/
i
n
d
e
x
.
h
t
m
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
l
a
b
o
r
d
o
c
.
i
l
o
.
o
r
g
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S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
e
t
.
 
•
 
C
I
S
D
O
C
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
n
e
a
r
l
y
 
5
0
,
0
0
0
 
c
i
t
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
d
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
o
c
c
u
p
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
:
 
l
a
w
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
c
h
e
m
i
c
a
l
 
s
a
f
e
t
y
,
 
d
a
t
a
 
s
h
e
e
t
s
,
 
t
r
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
,
 
a
r
t
i
c
l
e
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
i
c
a
l
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
b
o
o
k
s
 
a
n
d
 
I
L
O
 
c
o
n
v
e
n
t
i
o
n
s
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
S
e
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
 
 
 
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
F
u
n
d
 
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
d
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
d
 
o
n
 
r
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
i
n
c
o
m
e
 
b
y
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
(
t
a
x
,
 
l
e
n
d
i
n
g
,
 
b
o
n
d
s
,
 
e
t
c
)
,
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
 
b
y
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
(
d
e
f
e
n
s
e
,
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
,
 
e
t
c
.
)
 
f
o
r
 
a
l
l
 
l
e
v
e
l
s
 
o
f
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
(
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
,
 
s
t
a
t
e
,
 
l
o
c
a
l
)
.
 
D
a
t
a
 
i
s
 
i
n
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
c
u
r
r
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
 
o
n
 
e
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
h
e
a
l
t
h
,
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
g
r
i
c
u
l
t
u
r
e
 
s
h
o
w
n
 
a
l
s
o
 
a
s
 
a
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
g
r
o
s
s
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
 
(
G
D
P
)
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
m
f
.
o
r
g
/
e
x
t
e
r
n
a
l
/
p
u
b
s
/
p
u
b
s
/
s
t
a
t
p
a
c
k
.
h
t
m
 
 
 
 
 
“
T
h
e
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
L
a
b
o
r
 
(
2
0
0
3
)
”
 
J
.
 
B
o
t
e
r
o
,
 
S
.
 
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
,
 
F
.
 
L
ó
p
e
z
 
d
e
 
S
i
l
a
n
e
s
,
 
R
.
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
,
 
a
n
d
 
A
.
 
S
h
l
e
i
f
e
r
 
 
D
o
i
n
g
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
,
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
8
5
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
 
1
9
9
0
s
 
o
n
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
l
a
w
s
,
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
l
a
w
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
l
a
w
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
p
a
p
e
r
s
.
n
b
e
r
.
o
r
g
/
p
a
p
e
r
s
/
w
9
7
5
6
 
 
S
e
e
 
a
l
s
o
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
r
r
u
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
i
n
g
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
/
T
o
p
i
c
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
/
H
i
r
i
n
g
A
n
d
F
i
r
i
n
g
W
o
r
k
e
r
s
/
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
.
a
s
p
x
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
,
 
H
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
 
F
o
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
o
f
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
o
v
e
r
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
c
e
s
.
 
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
h
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
.
o
r
g
 
 
 
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
,
 
F
r
a
s
e
r
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
:
 
•
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
m
i
n
i
m
u
m
 
w
a
g
e
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
f
r
a
s
e
r
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
.
c
a
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S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
 
 
•
 
H
i
r
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
r
i
n
g
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
s
 
•
 
S
h
a
r
e
 
o
f
 
l
a
b
o
r
 
f
o
r
c
e
 
w
h
o
s
e
 
w
a
g
e
s
 
a
r
e
 
s
e
t
 
b
y
 
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
b
a
r
g
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
•
 
U
n
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
 
B
e
n
e
f
i
t
s
 
•
 
U
s
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
n
s
c
r
i
p
t
s
 
t
o
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
 
m
i
l
i
t
a
r
y
 
p
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
a
x
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
 
 
 
 
 
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
F
i
n
a
n
c
e
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
D
a
t
a
s
e
t
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
M
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
F
u
n
d
 
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
“
W
o
r
l
d
w
i
d
e
 
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
e
s
 
2
0
0
2
 
2
0
0
3
 
-
 
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
-
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
t
a
x
e
s
”
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
W
a
t
e
r
h
o
u
s
e
 
S
u
m
m
a
r
y
 
o
f
 
b
a
s
i
c
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
i
n
 
1
2
3
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
l
d
:
 
C
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
2
0
0
2
-
2
0
0
3
 
-
 
W
o
r
l
d
w
i
d
e
 
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
e
s
 
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
t
a
x
e
s
 
2
0
0
2
-
2
0
0
3
 
-
 
W
o
r
l
d
w
i
d
e
 
s
u
m
m
a
r
i
e
s
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
p
w
c
g
l
o
b
a
l
.
c
o
m
 
o
r
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
s
e
a
r
c
h
1
.
p
w
c
g
l
o
b
a
l
.
c
o
m
/
s
e
a
r
c
h
/
?
s
p
-
a
=
0
0
0
6
3
3
0
1
-
s
p
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
&
s
p
-
c
=
2
5
&
s
p
-
p
=
p
h
r
a
s
e
&
s
p
-
w
-
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
=
1
&
s
p
-
q
=
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
+
t
a
x
e
s
 
o
r
 
c
o
n
t
a
c
t
 
 
v
a
l
e
r
i
e
.
c
o
u
r
b
i
e
r
@
f
r
.
p
w
c
g
l
o
b
a
l
.
c
o
m
 
 
 
 
 
“
U
n
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
 
D
a
t
a
s
e
t
 
(
2
0
0
0
)
”
 
E
.
 
F
r
i
e
d
m
a
n
,
 
S
.
 
J
o
h
n
s
o
n
,
 
 
D
.
 
 
K
a
u
f
m
a
n
n
 
a
n
d
 
P
.
 
Z
o
i
d
o
 
L
o
b
a
t
o
n
.
 
T
h
i
s
 
d
a
t
a
s
e
t
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
u
n
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
 
f
o
r
 
6
9
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
l
d
.
 
A
n
 
e
x
p
o
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
i
s
 
d
a
t
a
 
c
a
n
 
b
e
 
f
o
u
n
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
p
e
r
 
"
D
o
d
g
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
G
r
a
b
b
i
n
g
 
H
a
n
d
:
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
a
n
t
s
 
o
f
 
u
n
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
i
n
 
6
9
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
"
.
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
o
u
r
c
e
.
p
h
p
?
t
o
p
i
c
=
1
3
&
t
y
p
e
=
1
8
 
 
 
 
 
 
“
T
h
e
 
M
o
d
e
r
n
 
V
A
T
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
”
 
L
.
 
E
b
r
i
l
l
,
 
M
.
 
K
e
e
n
,
 
J
.
P
.
 
B
o
d
i
n
,
 
a
n
d
 
V
.
 
S
u
m
m
e
r
s
 
T
h
i
s
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
h
a
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
u
p
 
t
o
 
1
2
2
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
o
n
 
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
 
a
s
p
e
c
t
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
V
A
T
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
:
 
 
 
•
 
D
a
t
e
 
V
A
T
 
I
n
t
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
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S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
•
 
V
A
T
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
(
i
n
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
)
 
o
 
S
t
a
n
d
a
r
d
 
r
a
t
e
 
o
 
O
t
h
e
r
 
R
a
t
e
s
 
•
 
T
h
r
e
s
h
o
l
d
 
(
i
n
 
U
.
S
.
 
d
o
l
l
a
r
s
)
 
o
 
B
a
s
i
c
 
o
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
•
 
V
A
T
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
o
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
T
a
x
 
R
e
v
e
n
u
e
 
o
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
G
D
P
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
B
u
r
e
a
u
 
o
f
 
F
i
s
c
a
l
 
D
o
c
u
m
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
T
h
i
s
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
h
a
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
t
a
x
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
,
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
b
r
o
a
d
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
:
 
o
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
 
T
a
x
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
o
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
T
a
x
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
o
 
A
s
i
a
-
P
a
c
i
f
i
c
 
T
a
x
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
i
s
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
r
e
h
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
t
a
x
 
m
a
n
u
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
,
 
H
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
 
F
o
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
i
s
c
a
l
 
b
u
r
d
e
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
i
m
p
o
s
e
s
 
o
n
 
i
t
s
 
c
i
t
i
z
e
n
s
:
 
t
a
x
 
r
a
t
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
f
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
.
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
h
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
.
o
r
g
 
 
 
 
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
I
N
F
R
A
S
T
R
U
C
T
U
R
E
 
A
N
D
 
P
U
B
L
I
C
 
F
I
R
M
S
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
,
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
T
h
e
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
(
P
P
I
)
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
s
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
,
 
n
e
w
l
y
 
o
w
n
e
d
 
o
r
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
d
 
b
y
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
,
 
t
h
a
t
 
r
e
a
c
h
e
d
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
 
c
l
o
s
u
r
e
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
1
9
8
4
 
i
n
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
(
e
l
e
c
t
r
i
c
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
n
a
t
u
r
a
l
 
g
a
s
)
,
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
w
a
t
e
r
.
 
C
o
v
e
r
a
g
e
:
 
1
9
8
4
-
2
0
0
0
.
 
N
o
.
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
:
 
1
5
0
.
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
v
i
e
w
.
p
h
p
?
t
o
p
i
c
=
1
4
&
t
y
p
e
=
1
8
&
i
d
=
3
3
5
1
 
 
 
 
 
O
f
f
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
T
h
i
s
 
o
f
f
i
c
e
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
s
 
a
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
t
h
a
t
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
d
e
t
a
i
l
e
d
 
t
e
l
e
c
o
m
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
t
a
c
t
s
 
p
e
r
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
i
a
o
n
l
i
n
e
.
o
r
g
/
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
/
r
e
f
/
c 
6
0
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
T
e
c
h
n
o
l
o
g
i
e
s
,
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
U
S
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
C
o
m
m
e
r
c
e
 
 
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
c
f
m
 
 
 
 
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
’
s
 
R
a
i
l
w
a
y
s
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
(
1
9
9
3
)
 
L
.
 
T
h
o
m
p
s
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
J
.
 
F
r
a
s
e
r
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
'
s
 
R
a
i
l
w
a
y
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
s
c
a
l
e
,
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
 
a
n
d
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
o
v
e
r
 
9
0
 
r
a
i
l
w
a
y
s
 
w
o
r
l
d
w
i
d
e
 
p
e
r
m
i
t
t
i
n
g
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
i
s
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
f
a
c
i
l
i
t
a
t
i
n
g
 
t
a
r
g
e
t
 
s
e
t
t
i
n
g
 
b
y
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
 
r
a
i
l
w
a
y
s
.
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
h
t
m
l
/
f
p
d
/
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
/
r
a
i
l
/
r
d
b
.
h
t
m
 
o
r
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
h
t
m
l
/
f
p
d
/
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
/
p
u
b
l
i
c
a
t
/
t
d
-
r
w
6
.
h
t
m
 
 
 
 
 
E
n
e
r
g
y
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
U
.
S
.
 
D
e
p
a
r
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
E
n
e
r
g
y
 
 
T
h
e
 
E
n
e
r
g
y
 
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
-
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
d
a
t
a
,
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
e
s
 
t
o
 
p
r
o
m
o
t
e
 
s
o
u
n
d
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
 
m
a
k
i
n
g
,
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
m
a
r
k
e
t
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
i
n
g
 
r
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
a
n
d
 
i
t
s
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
.
 
M
o
s
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
c
t
u
a
l
l
y
 
a
r
e
 
c
o
l
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
E
I
A
 
s
t
a
f
f
.
 
T
h
e
y
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
n
d
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
s
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
s
 
t
o
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
r
s
,
 
u
s
e
r
s
,
 
t
r
a
n
s
p
o
r
t
e
r
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
c
e
r
t
a
i
n
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
e
s
.
 
C
o
m
p
a
n
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
d
i
r
e
c
t
l
y
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
m
.
 
B
e
s
i
d
e
s
 
t
h
e
y
 
h
a
v
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
f
r
o
m
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
,
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
s
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
a
s
s
o
c
i
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
g
e
n
c
i
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
c
c
e
s
s
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
b
e
 
b
y
 
g
e
o
g
r
a
p
h
y
,
 
f
u
e
l
,
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
 
o
r
 
p
r
i
c
e
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
e
i
a
.
d
o
e
.
g
o
v
/
e
m
e
u
/
c
a
b
s
/
 
 
 
 
 
“
I
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
C
o
m
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
P
u
b
l
i
c
 
S
e
c
t
o
r
 
S
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
 
i
n
 
L
a
t
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
”
 
C
.
 
C
a
l
d
e
r
ó
n
,
 
W
.
 
E
a
s
t
e
r
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
L
.
 
S
e
r
v
é
n
 
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
e
s
 
b
o
t
h
 
p
h
y
s
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
o
f
 
q
u
a
n
t
i
t
y
 
a
n
d
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
e
n
d
o
w
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
o
f
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
f
r
a
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
e
x
p
e
n
d
i
t
u
r
e
s
.
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
p
r
i
m
a
r
y
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
s
 
a
r
e
:
 
i
)
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
T
e
l
e
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
U
n
i
o
n
;
 
i
i
)
 
A
T
&
T
;
 
i
i
i
)
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
-
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
a
l
 
Y
e
a
r
b
o
o
k
,
 
E
n
e
r
g
y
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
a
n
d
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
s
’
 
R
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
o
m
m
i
s
s
i
o
n
 
-
;
 
i
v
)
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
-
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
’
s
 
R
a
i
l
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
D
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
-
;
 
v
)
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
R
o
a
d
 
F
e
d
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
-
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
R
o
a
d
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
-
;
 
M
i
t
c
h
e
l
l
’
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
H
i
s
t
o
r
i
c
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
.
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
 
m
a
y
 
b
e
 
c
o
n
t
a
c
t
e
d
 
a
t
:
 
c
c
a
l
d
e
r
o
@
b
c
e
n
t
r
a
l
.
c
l
 
  
6
1
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
 
 
 
B
u
r
e
a
u
c
r
a
t
s
 
i
n
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
:
 
 
T
h
e
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
t
i
m
e
 
s
e
r
i
e
s
 
d
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
k
e
y
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
b
i
n
g
 
s
t
a
t
e
-
o
w
n
e
d
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
 
s
e
c
t
o
r
s
 
(
e
.
g
.
 
v
a
l
u
e
 
a
d
d
e
d
,
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
,
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
m
e
n
t
,
 
d
e
b
t
)
 
f
o
r
 
a
p
p
r
o
x
i
m
a
t
e
l
y
 
4
0
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
1
9
7
1
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
1
9
9
1
.
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
/
p
r
o
j
e
c
t
s
/
b
i
b
d
a
t
a
.
h
t
m
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
E
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
M
a
r
k
e
t
s
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
n
d
 
l
i
t
e
r
a
t
u
r
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
m
a
n
y
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
i
n
g
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
e
s
.
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
l
i
n
k
.
c
o
m
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
I
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
 
2
0
0
0
:
 
C
r
o
s
s
-
b
o
r
d
e
r
 
M
e
r
g
e
r
 
a
n
d
 
A
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
(
2
0
0
0
)
 
U
n
i
t
e
d
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
C
o
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
o
n
 
T
r
a
d
e
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
 
T
r
a
n
s
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
v
a
l
u
e
s
 
o
f
 
c
r
o
s
s
 
b
o
r
d
e
r
 
m
e
r
g
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
c
q
u
i
s
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
i
z
e
d
 
f
i
r
m
s
,
 
b
y
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
s
e
l
l
e
r
,
 
1
9
8
7
-
1
9
9
9
.
 
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
r
0
.
u
n
c
t
a
d
.
o
r
g
/
w
i
r
 
 
 
 
 
 
L
E
G
A
L
 
A
N
D
 
R
E
G
U
L
A
T
O
R
Y
 
F
R
A
M
E
W
O
R
K
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
 
1
9
9
7
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
6
7
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
 
1
9
9
0
s
.
 
 
I
t
s
 
p
u
r
p
o
s
e
 
i
s
 
t
o
 
h
e
l
p
 
u
n
d
e
r
s
t
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
a
i
n
t
s
 
i
m
p
o
s
e
d
 
b
y
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
v
a
r
i
o
u
s
 
a
r
e
a
s
.
 
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
v
i
e
w
.
p
h
p
?
t
o
p
i
c
=
1
3
&
t
y
p
e
=
1
8
&
i
d
=
1
4
9
8
2
 
 
 
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
(
2
0
0
0
/
1
)
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
T
h
e
 
W
B
E
S
 
i
s
 
a
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
 
1
0
,
0
0
0
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
8
0
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
n
e
 
t
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
y
 
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
0
 
t
h
a
t
 
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
 
a
 
w
i
d
e
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
.
 
B
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
f
a
c
e
-
t
o
-
f
a
c
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
r
m
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
,
 
W
B
E
S
 
i
s
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
a
s
 
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
,
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
r
y
,
 
l
o
b
b
y
i
n
g
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
c
a
n
 
t
h
e
n
 
b
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
f
i
r
m
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
r
m
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
.
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
v
i
e
w
.
p
h
p
?
t
o
p
i
c
=
1
3
&
t
y
p
e
=
1
8
&
i
d
=
1
4
9
9
2
 
  
6
2
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
 
 
 
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
T
h
e
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
(
B
E
E
P
S
)
,
 
d
e
v
e
l
o
p
e
d
 
j
o
i
n
t
l
y
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
B
a
n
k
 
f
o
r
 
R
e
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
,
 
i
s
 
a
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
o
f
 
o
v
e
r
 
4
0
0
0
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
2
2
 
t
r
a
n
s
i
t
i
o
n
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
c
o
n
d
u
c
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
1
9
9
9
-
2
0
0
0
 
t
h
a
t
 
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
 
a
 
w
i
d
e
 
r
a
n
g
e
 
o
f
 
i
n
t
e
r
a
c
t
i
o
n
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
.
 
B
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
f
a
c
e
-
t
o
-
f
a
c
e
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
f
i
r
m
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
o
w
n
e
r
s
,
 
B
E
E
P
S
 
i
s
 
d
e
s
i
g
n
e
d
 
t
o
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
e
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
s
u
c
h
 
a
r
e
a
s
 
a
s
 
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
,
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
,
 
l
o
b
b
y
i
n
g
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
c
a
n
 
t
h
e
n
 
b
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
f
i
r
m
 
c
h
a
r
a
c
t
e
r
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
a
n
d
 
f
i
r
m
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
v
i
e
w
.
p
h
p
?
t
o
p
i
c
=
1
3
&
t
y
p
e
=
1
8
&
i
d
=
3
4
4
6
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B
u
r
e
a
u
c
r
a
t
s
 
i
n
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
:
 
 
T
h
e
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
s
t
 
I
n
t
e
l
l
i
g
e
n
c
e
 
U
n
i
t
,
 
T
h
e
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
s
t
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
a
n
a
l
y
z
e
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
t
r
e
n
d
s
 
i
n
 
n
e
a
r
l
y
 
2
0
0
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
y
 
s
h
o
w
 
y
o
u
 
e
x
a
c
t
l
y
 
h
o
w
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
,
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
g
l
o
b
a
l
 
e
v
e
n
t
s
 
w
i
l
l
 
a
f
f
e
c
t
 
y
o
u
r
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
h
o
r
t
 
t
o
 
m
e
d
i
u
m
 
t
e
r
m
.
 
A
v
a
i
l
a
b
l
e
 
i
n
 
d
i
g
i
t
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
n
t
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
s
,
 
e
a
c
h
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
 
e
x
a
m
i
n
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
p
l
a
i
n
s
 
t
h
e
 
i
s
s
u
e
s
 
s
h
a
p
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
y
o
u
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
:
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
s
c
e
n
e
,
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
p
o
l
i
c
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
e
i
g
n
 
t
r
a
d
e
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
A
n
d
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
c
o
n
c
i
s
e
 
1
8
-
2
4
-
m
o
n
t
h
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
s
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
m
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
i
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
e
i
u
.
c
o
m
 
 
 
 
 
“
U
n
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
y
 
D
a
t
a
s
e
t
 
(
2
0
0
0
)
”
,
 
E
.
 
F
r
i
e
d
m
a
n
,
 
S
.
 
J
o
h
n
s
o
n
,
 
D
.
 
 
K
a
u
f
m
a
n
n
 
a
n
d
 
P
.
 
Z
o
i
d
o
 
L
o
b
a
t
o
n
.
 
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
6
3
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
“
T
h
e
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
E
n
t
r
y
 
(
2
0
0
1
)
”
 
F
.
 
L
ó
p
e
z
 
d
e
 
S
i
l
a
n
e
s
,
 
S
.
 
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
,
 
R
.
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
,
 
a
n
d
 
A
.
 
S
h
l
e
i
f
e
r
.
 
 
D
o
i
n
g
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
 
I
t
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
s
 
n
e
w
 
d
a
t
a
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
t
r
y
 
o
f
 
s
t
a
r
t
-
u
p
 
f
i
r
m
s
 
i
n
 
8
5
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
 
c
o
v
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
n
u
m
b
e
r
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
,
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
t
i
m
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
t
h
a
t
 
a
 
s
t
a
r
t
-
u
p
 
f
i
r
m
 
m
u
s
t
 
b
e
a
r
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
i
t
 
c
a
n
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
 
l
e
g
a
l
l
y
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
v
i
e
w
.
p
h
p
?
t
y
p
e
=
5
&
i
d
=
2
3
7
9
 
 
S
e
e
 
a
l
s
o
,
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
r
r
u
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
i
n
g
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
/
T
o
p
i
c
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
/
E
n
t
r
y
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
.
a
s
p
x
 
 
 
 
 
“
T
h
e
 
P
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
 
o
f
 
J
u
s
t
i
c
e
”
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
,
 
a
n
d
 
 
“
C
o
u
r
t
s
:
 
T
h
e
 
L
e
x
 
M
u
n
d
i
 
P
r
o
j
e
c
t
”
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
F
.
 
L
ó
p
e
z
 
d
e
 
S
i
l
a
n
e
s
,
 
S
.
 
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
,
 
R
.
 
L
a
 
P
o
r
t
a
,
 
a
n
d
 
A
.
 
S
h
l
e
i
f
e
r
 
 
D
o
i
n
g
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
T
h
e
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
f
o
r
 
1
0
9
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
 
1
9
9
0
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
j
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
a
s
 
c
a
p
t
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
w
o
 
c
o
u
r
t
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
:
 
•
 
E
v
i
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
 
t
e
n
a
n
t
 
f
o
r
 
n
o
n
-
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
o
 
F
o
r
m
a
l
i
s
m
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
 
o
 
T
i
m
e
 
n
e
e
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
 
 
•
 
C
o
l
l
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
a
 
b
o
u
n
c
e
d
 
c
h
e
c
k
 
o
 
F
o
r
m
a
l
i
s
m
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
 
T
i
m
e
 
n
e
e
d
e
d
 
i
n
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
c
e
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
p
o
s
t
.
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
.
h
a
r
v
a
r
d
.
e
d
u
/
f
a
c
u
l
t
y
/
l
a
p
o
r
t
a
/
p
a
p
e
r
s
/
l
e
x
p
a
p
e
r
2
.
p
d
f
 
 
S
e
e
 
a
l
s
o
,
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
r
r
u
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
i
n
g
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
/
M
e
t
h
o
d
o
l
o
g
y
/
C
o
n
t
r
a
c
t
E
n
f
o
r
c
e
m
e
n
t
.
a
s
p
x
 
 
 
 
 
"
E
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
i
n
 
B
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
"
,
 
2
0
0
3
.
 
S
.
 
D
j
a
n
k
o
v
,
 
O
.
 
H
a
r
t
,
 
T
.
 
N
e
n
o
v
a
,
 
a
n
d
 
A
.
 
S
h
l
e
i
f
e
r
,
 
 
 
D
o
i
n
g
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
s
t
,
 
d
u
r
a
t
i
o
n
,
 
o
b
s
e
r
v
a
n
c
e
 
o
f
 
p
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
 
c
l
a
i
m
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
r
o
l
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
 
i
n
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
c
r
o
s
s
-
s
e
c
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
f
o
r
 
a
b
o
u
t
 
8
5
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
l
a
t
e
 
1
9
9
0
s
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
e
x
a
m
i
n
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
 
i
s
 
d
o
n
e
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
a
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
t
o
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
 
p
r
o
f
e
s
s
i
o
n
a
l
s
 
(
l
a
w
y
e
r
s
,
 
a
c
c
o
u
n
t
a
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
j
u
d
g
e
s
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
c
o
v
e
r
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
e
p
-
b
y
-
s
t
e
p
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
s
 
o
n
 
f
i
l
i
n
g
 
f
o
r
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
 
p
r
o
c
e
e
d
i
n
g
s
,
 
i
n
i
t
i
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
,
 
t
h
e
 
p
e
t
i
t
i
o
n
 
h
e
a
r
i
n
g
,
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
r
t
’
s
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
,
 
t
h
e
 
a
p
p
o
i
n
t
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
a
n
 
i
n
s
o
l
v
e
n
c
y
 
p
r
a
c
t
i
t
i
o
n
e
r
,
 
t
h
e
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
c
l
a
i
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
o
r
d
e
r
i
n
g
 
b
y
 
p
r
i
o
r
i
t
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
l
e
 
o
f
 
a
s
s
e
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
a
n
s
w
e
r
s
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
s
e
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
r
e
 
u
s
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
e
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
n
k
r
u
p
t
c
y
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
,
 
a
s
 
w
e
l
l
 
a
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
w
e
r
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
u
r
t
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
r
r
u
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
i
n
g
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
/
T
o
p
i
c
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
/
C
l
o
s
i
n
g
A
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
/
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
.
a
s
p
x
 
 
S
e
e
 
a
l
s
o
,
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
r
r
u
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
D
o
i
n
g
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
/
T
o
p
i
c
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
/
C
l
o
s
i
n
g
A
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
/
D
e
f
a
u
l
t
.
a
s
p
x
 
 
 
 
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
,
 
R
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
,
 
i
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
:
 
•
 
P
r
i
c
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
f
r
a
s
e
r
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
.
c
a
  
6
4
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
F
r
a
s
e
r
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
 
 
•
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
b
u
r
e
a
u
c
r
a
c
y
 
r
e
d
 
t
a
p
e
 
•
 
O
b
s
t
a
c
l
e
s
 
i
n
 
s
t
a
r
t
i
n
g
 
a
 
n
e
w
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
•
 
I
r
r
e
g
u
l
a
r
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
s
 
c
o
n
n
e
c
t
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
m
p
o
r
t
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
p
o
r
t
 
p
e
r
m
i
t
s
,
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
l
i
c
e
n
s
e
s
,
 
e
x
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
,
 
t
a
x
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
s
,
 
p
o
l
i
c
e
 
p
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
,
 
o
r
 
l
o
a
n
 
a
p
p
l
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
R
e
g
a
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
g
a
l
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
c
u
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
,
 
i
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
n
:
 
•
 
J
u
d
i
c
i
a
l
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
c
e
 
•
 
I
m
p
a
r
t
i
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
c
o
u
r
t
s
 
•
 
P
r
o
t
e
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
i
n
t
e
l
l
e
c
t
u
a
l
 
p
r
o
p
e
r
t
y
 
 
•
 
M
i
l
i
t
a
r
y
 
i
n
t
e
r
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
r
u
l
e
 
o
f
 
l
a
w
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
p
r
o
c
e
s
s
 
•
 
I
n
t
e
g
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
l
e
g
a
l
 
s
y
s
t
e
m
 
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
o
f
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
,
 
H
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
 
F
o
u
n
d
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
I
t
s
 
i
n
d
e
x
 
o
n
 
“
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
”
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
i
n
f
o
r
m
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
h
a
t
 
m
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
h
o
w
 
e
a
s
y
 
o
r
 
d
i
f
f
i
c
u
l
t
 
i
t
 
i
s
 
t
o
 
o
p
e
n
 
a
n
d
 
o
p
e
r
a
t
e
 
a
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
,
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
o
f
 
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
,
 
a
n
d
 
w
h
e
t
h
e
r
 
r
e
g
u
l
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
p
p
l
y
 
u
n
i
f
o
r
m
l
y
 
t
o
 
a
l
l
 
b
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
.
 
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
h
e
r
i
t
a
g
e
.
o
r
g
 
 
 
 
G
O
V
E
R
N
A
N
C
E
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
D
e
v
e
l
o
p
m
e
n
t
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
 
1
9
9
7
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
 
 
 
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
(
2
0
0
0
/
1
)
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
 
 
 
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
a
n
d
 
E
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
 
P
e
r
f
o
r
m
a
n
c
e
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
.
 
  
6
5
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
 
 
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
 
I
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
(
1
9
9
7
/
9
8
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
0
/
0
1
)
 
D
.
K
a
u
f
m
a
n
n
,
 
A
.
 
K
r
a
a
y
,
 
a
n
d
 
M
a
s
s
i
m
o
 
M
a
s
t
r
u
z
z
i
 
T
h
i
s
 
d
a
t
a
b
a
s
e
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
s
 
c
o
m
p
o
s
i
t
e
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
 
i
n
d
i
c
a
t
o
r
s
 
f
o
r
 
1
7
5
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
1
9
9
7
/
9
8
 
a
n
d
 
2
0
0
0
/
0
1
 
f
o
r
 
s
i
x
 
d
i
m
e
n
s
i
o
n
s
 
o
f
 
g
o
v
e
r
n
a
n
c
e
:
 
i
)
 
V
o
i
c
e
 
a
n
d
 
A
c
c
o
u
n
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
;
 
i
i
)
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
S
t
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
;
 
i
i
i
)
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
;
 
i
v
)
 
R
e
g
u
l
a
t
o
r
y
 
Q
u
a
l
i
t
y
;
 
v
)
 
R
u
l
e
 
o
f
 
L
a
w
;
 
a
n
d
 
v
i
)
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
o
f
 
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
e
c
o
n
.
w
o
r
l
d
b
a
n
k
.
o
r
g
/
v
i
e
w
.
p
h
p
?
t
o
p
i
c
=
1
3
&
t
y
p
e
=
1
8
&
i
d
=
1
4
9
8
0
 
 
 
 
 
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
P
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
I
n
d
e
x
,
 
T
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
T
h
e
 
T
I
 
C
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
P
e
r
c
e
p
t
i
o
n
s
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
C
P
I
)
 
r
a
n
k
s
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
t
e
r
m
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
t
o
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
c
o
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
i
s
 
p
e
r
c
e
i
v
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
x
i
s
t
 
a
m
o
n
g
 
p
u
b
l
i
c
 
o
f
f
i
c
i
a
l
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
i
a
n
s
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
s
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
.
o
r
g
 
o
r
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
t
r
a
n
s
p
a
r
e
n
c
y
.
o
r
g
/
s
u
r
v
e
y
s
/
i
n
d
e
x
.
h
t
m
l
#
c
p
i
 
 
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
Y
e
a
r
b
o
o
k
,
 
I
M
D
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
Y
e
a
r
b
o
o
k
 
(
W
C
Y
)
 
i
s
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
r
e
h
e
n
s
i
v
e
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
s
,
 
r
a
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
a
n
a
l
y
z
i
n
g
 
h
o
w
 
a
 
n
a
t
i
o
n
’
s
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
 
s
u
s
t
a
i
n
s
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
o
f
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
.
 
I
t
 
f
e
a
t
u
r
e
s
 
4
9
 
i
n
d
u
s
t
r
i
a
l
i
z
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
e
m
e
r
g
i
n
g
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
3
1
4
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
t
 
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
 
(
h
a
r
d
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
n
d
 
s
u
r
v
e
y
 
d
a
t
a
)
,
 
g
r
o
u
p
e
d
 
i
n
t
o
 
f
o
u
r
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
I
n
p
u
t
 
F
a
c
t
o
r
s
.
 
H
a
r
d
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
g
i
o
n
a
l
 
o
r
g
a
n
i
z
a
t
i
o
n
s
 
a
n
d
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
i
n
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
s
.
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
d
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
d
r
a
w
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
E
x
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
O
p
i
n
i
o
n
 
S
u
r
v
e
y
 
(
3
,
5
3
2
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
e
n
t
s
)
.
 
D
a
t
a
 
a
r
e
 
a
g
g
r
e
g
a
t
e
d
 
o
v
e
r
 
5
-
y
e
a
r
 
p
e
r
i
o
d
.
 
P
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
i
n
t
e
r
r
u
p
t
i
o
n
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
1
9
8
9
.
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
0
1
.
i
m
d
.
c
h
/
w
c
y
/
 
 
 
 
 
G
l
o
b
a
l
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
,
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
o
r
u
m
 
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
F
o
r
u
m
 
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
s
 
y
e
a
r
l
y
 
c
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
s
 
c
o
v
e
r
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
m
a
j
o
r
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
e
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
l
d
.
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
G
l
o
b
a
l
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
R
e
p
o
r
t
 
r
a
n
k
s
 
7
5
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
G
r
o
w
t
h
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
G
C
I
)
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
M
i
c
r
o
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
M
I
C
I
)
,
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
c
o
m
b
i
n
e
d
 
e
n
c
a
p
s
u
l
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
 
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
r
e
n
g
t
h
s
 
a
n
d
 
w
e
a
k
n
e
s
s
e
s
 
o
f
 
g
r
o
w
t
h
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
y
.
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
w
e
f
o
r
u
m
.
o
r
g
/
s
i
t
e
/
h
o
m
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
.
n
s
f
/
C
o
n
t
e
n
t
/
G
l
o
b
a
l
+
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
+
P
r
o
g
r
a
m
m
e
%
5
C
R
e
p
o
r
t
s
%
5
C
G
l
o
b
a
l
+
C
o
m
p
e
t
i
t
i
v
e
n
e
s
s
+
R
e
p
o
r
t
+
2
0
0
2
-
2
0
0
3
 
 
 
 
 
B
u
r
e
a
u
c
r
a
t
s
 
i
n
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
:
 
 
T
h
e
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
s
 
a
n
d
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
s
 
o
f
 
G
o
v
e
r
n
m
e
n
t
 
O
w
n
e
r
s
h
i
p
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
  
6
6
S
o
u
r
c
e
 
D
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
L
i
n
k
s
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
,
 
T
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
B
a
n
k
 
 
 
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
s
t
 
I
n
t
e
l
l
i
g
e
n
c
e
 
U
n
i
t
,
 
T
h
e
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
s
t
 
 
S
e
e
 
d
e
s
c
r
i
p
t
i
o
n
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
 
 
 
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
W
o
r
l
d
 
F
r
e
e
d
o
m
 
H
o
u
s
e
 
I
t
 
p
r
o
v
i
d
e
s
 
a
n
 
a
n
n
u
a
l
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
a
s
s
e
s
s
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
a
t
e
 
o
f
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
r
i
g
h
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
i
v
i
l
 
l
i
b
e
r
t
i
e
s
 
i
n
 
1
9
2
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
 
a
n
d
 
1
7
 
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
p
u
t
e
d
 
t
e
r
r
i
t
o
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
f
r
e
e
d
o
m
h
o
u
s
e
.
o
r
g
/
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
/
 
 
 
 
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
R
i
s
k
 
G
u
i
d
e
,
 
P
R
S
 
G
r
o
u
p
,
 
I
n
c
 
T
h
e
 
I
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
C
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
R
i
s
k
 
G
u
i
d
e
 
(
I
C
R
G
)
,
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
e
d
 
b
y
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
R
i
s
k
 
S
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
,
 
i
s
 
a
 
p
r
e
d
i
c
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
o
l
 
f
o
r
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
I
C
R
G
 
i
n
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
t
e
s
 
s
e
v
e
r
a
l
 
e
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
 
r
i
s
k
 
f
a
c
t
o
r
s
 
t
o
 
d
e
t
e
r
m
i
n
e
 
a
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
’
s
 
i
n
v
e
s
t
m
e
n
t
 
p
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
,
 
i
n
c
l
u
d
i
n
g
 
l
o
a
n
 
d
e
f
a
u
l
t
,
 
d
e
l
a
y
e
d
 
p
a
y
m
e
n
t
 
o
f
 
s
u
p
p
l
i
e
r
s
’
 
c
r
e
d
i
t
s
,
 
p
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
l
e
a
d
e
r
s
h
i
p
,
 
r
u
l
e
 
o
f
 
l
a
w
,
 
q
u
a
l
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
b
u
r
e
a
u
c
r
a
c
y
,
 
i
n
f
l
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
t
e
r
n
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
l
i
q
u
i
d
i
t
y
 
r
a
t
i
o
s
.
 
E
a
c
h
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
y
 
i
s
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
a
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
 
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
 
a
n
d
 
a
l
s
o
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
n
e
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
s
 
a
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
r
i
s
k
 
i
n
d
e
x
.
 
 
 
 
W
e
b
 
l
i
n
k
:
 
h
t
t
p
:
/
/
w
w
w
.
i
c
r
g
o
n
l
i
n
e
.
c
o
m
/
i
c
r
g
M
e
t
h
o
d
s
.
a
s
p
 
 
 
 
 
 
B
u
s
i
n
e
s
s
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
R
i
s
k
 
I
n
t
e
l
l
i
g
e
n
c
e
,
 
B
E
R
I
 
S
.
A
.
 
B
E
R
I
 
S
.
A
.
 
i
s
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
i
v
a
t
e
 
s
o
u
r
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
r
i
s
k
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
,
 
a
n
a
l
y
s
e
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
f
o
r
e
c
a
s
t
s
 
f
o
r
 
o
v
e
r
 
1
4
0
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
 
 
E
c
o
n
o
m
i
c
,
 
f
i
n
a
n
c
i
a
l
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n
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r
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p
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r
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t
i
n
g
,
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n
d
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o
l
i
t
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c
a
l
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o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
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r
e
 
i
n
t
e
g
r
a
l
 
c
o
m
p
o
n
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n
t
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o
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h
e
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r
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o
r
s
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c
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s
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0
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(
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e
s
t
 
c
a
s
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)
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y
s
t
e
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r
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s
s
e
s
s
i
n
g
 
c
o
u
n
t
r
i
e
s
.
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p
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h
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i
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s
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s
s
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n
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O
p
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r
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t
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n
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i
s
k
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n
d
e
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O
R
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n
d
 
t
h
e
 
P
o
l
i
t
i
c
a
l
 
R
i
s
k
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n
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e
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)
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h
r
e
e
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i
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p
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a
r
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h
e
n
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r
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n
s
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t
e
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t
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a
l
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t
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t
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v
e
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s
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e
s
s
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n
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o
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r
r
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n
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n
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t
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n
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r
e
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o
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t
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n
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